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AGAIN the Chancellor has answered the demand for a definition of German peace terms with an uncompromising negative. Again he has refused to commit the Imperial Government either to any specific program of annexation or to any specific renunciation of such a program. But as the result of the refusal he has done nothing to diminish the difficulties of the Imperial Government. He has only made it the more certain that in the end he will be obliged to come out into the open and frankly seek the support either of the Pan-Germans or of their increasingly aggressive and numerous opponents. Reluctant as he is to admit it, he is confronted by an exclusive choice. He must choose between an indefinitely prolonged war waged frankly for conquest or for a peace without victory. He has twisted and manoeuvered and struggled to escape the sharp hooks of the alternative. He has tried by proposing a peace conference to place the responsibility for continuing the war on the allied enemies of Germany. He has tried to detach Russia from the Alliance by offering to accept something like the Russian formula for the eastern front. He has sought to win back popular support by the promise of internal reforms. He has succeeded in delaying the choice, but he has succeeded only by playing off one group of his domestic opponents against the other. He has failed to build up any sufficient following for his own policy of trying to convert a war without victory into a peace with victory.

THE Chancellor cannot build up any following for his own policy of procrastination because it is based on an attempt to evade inexorable facts. The German military party plunged the world into this war in the expectation of winning a decisive victory and of securing its fruits by erecting Germany into the dominant European Power. The Pan-Germans have not abandoned this ambition, and if Germany were by means of the submarine campaign still to win a victory their plans would be carried out. But the German government has never officially announced a policy of conquest, and if it made such a confession in advance of victory it would excite relentless opposition both at home and abroad. The Chancellor wants it both ways. He wants to get for Germany the full benefit of possible victorious conquest, while pretending at the same time that the war is continued only to save Germany from the consequences of defeat. He might succeed in continuing this diplomacy of evasion were it not for one stubborn fact. The German people are craving for peace. They are insisting on a diplomacy which moves in the direction of peace. But if peace cannot be achieved as the result of victory, and if the German people cannot be kept united by flourishing the prospect of peace with victory and conquest, the German government can retain popular support only by adopting wholly new tactics. It must, as we have said, fall back on peace without victory, and in the event of failure spur the German people to renewed efforts by the apparent demonstration that they are fighting an exclusively defensive war. This is the alternative which the Chancellor would doubtless accept, if he dared, but he does not dare. Considering the structure and history of the Prussian

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military system, the express renunciation of conquest and victory would make its survival precarious, if not impossible.

WHAT has made and will make it impossible for the Chancellor to continue his policy of procrastinating evasion is the Russian revolutionary republic and its peace formula. The diplomacy of the Western Allies played into his hands by arousing in the German people apprehensions for their future safety and independence. But the scrupulously and frankly unaggressive program of the new Russia relieved German fears and encouraged the German opponents of their own government to agitate openly for peace. It is the Russians who are smoking out the Chancellor and the Kaiser. They have infected the diplomacy of the Allies with the leaven which it has so sorely needed. They have succeeded in beginning the disintegration of the apparently cast-iron patriotic morale of the German nation. The Russian people have been conducting an informal negotiation with the people of Germany behind the backs of chancellors and foreign offices, and by this negotiation they have rendered immense assistance to the work which still has to be done by Allied armies. The breaking down of German military resistance remains a most formidable task, which must be pursued with unflinching determination and with every available weapon, but it is ceasing to be a task which will be accomplished only by soldiers. The Germans themselves are instructing their enemies how effectively their resistance can be impaired by the cultivation of internal dissensions in the house of the enemy. The seeds of such dissensions are contained in the attempt of the German government to wage a war aggressive in the eyes of the ruling class and defensive in the eyes of the people.

WHATEVER abstruse elements may be involved in the German political crisis, one fact emerges plain and incontrovertible. The German Socialists' demand for peace without annexation and indemnity is not inspired by the Kaiser or Prussian militarism. Scheidemann is not a government tool. Autocracy does not want the status quo ante. The Russian agitation was more embarrassing to Germany than to the Entente. All Americans, Englishmen and Frenchmen who insulted the Russian radicals by calling them German agents should now offer a genuine apology.

SCANDINAVIA and Holland have good reason to be alarmed over the possible consequences of our new export policy. We hold practically absolute control of the world's food surplus and may give or withhold as we choose. We may make such conditions as seem expedient to us, and there can be no doubt that we shall make conditions restricting the trade of the neutrals with Germany. How far we can safely go in this direction requires careful deliberation. Sweden, for example, exports huge quantities of high grade iron ore to Germany. Shall we make use of Sweden's dependence upon us for food to compel the stoppage of iron exports to Germany? It would materially advance our cause if these exports could be cut off. Germany is in great need of Swedish ore. But the very fact of the indispensability of Swedish ore to Germany would make it a very dangerous thing for Sweden to embargo exports. For us to require this of Sweden would be almost tantamount to saying, Fight Germany or starve. The Swedes are an obstinate people, and if they were confronted with such an alternative, they would probably go over to Germany.

HOLLAND has no trade with Germany that would compare in importance with the Swedish ore trade. But the leakage of food into Germany through Holland is probably greater than through any other neutral. This can be stopped if the matter is managed discreetly. Germany may bluster and threaten Holland with invasion if she does not resist Allied coercion. Holland may threaten to join the Teutonic alliance. It is a safe guess, however, that Holland will remain neutral. Even if Holland wished to go over to the Teutonic alliance, the Germans would probably dissuade her. The Germans do not wish the rich colonial domain of Holland to fall prey to the sea Powers, as they hope to win this domain for themselves at a later time, when they annex Holland. Nor would the Allies win any important advantage if Holland threw in her lot with them. To invade Germany through Holland would hardly be practicable. The probable outcome of a Dutch war against Germany would be the lodgment of the Germans on the North Sea coast in more favorable positions than any they now occupy.

IF it hadn't been for drink this country might by this time have had in operation a coherent and effective food control law. Beer and wine worked mischief enough in the progress of the bill, but the principal agent of confusion was naturally whiskey. Our original intentions were good enough. We had an exaggerated notion of the waste of grain in brewing and distilling; accordingly our first thought was to put an end at once to those industries. But thereupon we were confronted with the fact that the vast stocks of distilled liquors in bond would flow out to take the place in general consumption of the less noxious liquors.

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Hence the project of commandeering all stocks of distilled liquors, with the collateral purpose of redistilling them for munitions manufacture. Very little of this program was relevant to the question of food control. A strong case can be made out for prohibition, especially in wartime, but it would have been infinitely better if the prohibition question had been handled in a separate measure. By this time we might have had food control and prohibition too.

THE Russian offensive is beginning to look as if it might have useful military results. No doubt it is wholly improbable that the Russian government has sufficient resources to carry on a sustained and powerful attack, but a sustained and powerful attack may not be necessary. When General Brusiloff took the offensive in the spring of 1916 his successes exceeded all expectations, because he met with such feeble resistance on the part of the Austro-Hungarian troops. They were not prepared and did not want to fight, and they not only were willing to be beaten but they surrendered and deserted in large numbers. Not until the line was stiffened with German troops was his advance halted. It is always possible that a renewed Russian attack will meet for a like reason with a like success. If many of the Austro-Hungarian troops did not wish to fight the armies of Imperial Russia in the summer of 1916, they are still less likely a year later to fight with any determination against the armies of Republican Russia. Even if the Germans have taken precautions against another edition of the Brusiloff success, the precautions may well prove to be insufficient. At this stage of the war a very little Russian victory in the southeastern front would do much to accelerate the disintegration of Austro-Hungarian military power.

A COMPARATIVELY feeble Russian offensive will also prove costly to the Germans far beyond its immediate military results. It will tend to prevent that concentration of German military resources upon which their most effective expenditure depends. If Germany can only be forced to use up troops and guns in stiffening still further the Austro-Hungarian line, her ability either to resist a French and British offensive in the west or to organize a counter offensive of her own will be by just so much diminished. The time must be approaching when more active fighting will be resumed in France. Some of the hardest blows of the war will be delivered during two months by both sides; and if the Russians can continue attacks which are only sporadic and without much staying power their assistance may still enable the western Allies to accomplish considerable results. The value of such attacks is similar to that of an aeroplane raid. Raids may not do much damage, but they compel the enemy to take expensive precautions.

AN odd contrast is furnished by the peace program announced by the German minority Socialists and the St. Louis resolutions just ratified by the orthodox American Socialist party. The German minority declares for absolute restoration and reparation for Belgium, northern France and Serbia, for Polish unity and independence, for a plebiscite by Alsace-Lorraine as to whether it wishes to return to France. It holds to the principle of internationalism, and concludes by a plea to the proletariat in all countries to oppose governments which do not accept the international program. At the same time the American Socialists condemn the American government for giving its effective support to practically the same terms outlined by their German comrades. If American Socialists had wished to give expression to their doctrinaire pacifism, they might have contented themselves with a resolution to the effect that they do not believe American aims can be attained by war. But they went far beyond this, calling our war one of the most unjust ever waged. If those Americans who still cling to the Socialist party can be influenced by nothing but German thought, here at last is something to startle them.

CROESUS, king of the Lydians and other nations, being in doubt whether to make war upon the Medes, sent messengers to consult the oracle at Delphi. And at the second time of asking the Pythian made this answer: "When a mule shall become king of the Medes, then, tender-footed Lydian, flee over pebbly Hermus, nor tarry, nor blush to be a coward." This cryptic message delighted Croesus, who proceeded to make war upon the Medes. Later, when he had been defeated, and was Cyrus's prisoner, he sent again to Delphi, to ask whether the god were not ashamed of having led him astray. But the Pythian replied by inviting Croesus to lay the blame on himself. When he last consulted the oracle, said the Pythian, Croesus "did not understand the answer concerning the mule; for Cyrus was that mule; inasmuch as he was born of parents of different nations, the mother superior, but the father inferior." Upon hearing this elaborate explanation Croesus sat back in his chair, travailed in thought, and reached the conclusion that cryptic despatches can always be improved by elaboration. An opinion which survives in some public information bureaus even unto this day.

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Germany's Implacable Foe

TIME runs remorselessly against Germany. It was to defeat time that Germany chose the summer of 1914 for the settling of conclusions with Russia. In another decade Russia might be too strong to be readily disposed of. The supreme importance to Germany of defeating time accounted for the ultimatum to France and the invasion of Belgium. Beating time was the objective of the unrestricted submarine warfare that brought the United States into the war.

Grant the Allies time and Germany is done for. Time will defeat or outwit the submarines; it will reorganize the fighting strength of Russia; it will bring the American millions into the field; it will produce dissensions among Germany's allies and eventually lead to apostasies. And it is becoming increasingly certain that the Allies will have the time they need. Russia might have been brought to terms in the late days of the autocracy or the early days of the republic, but hardly now. A German drive at the heart of Russia would only harden the Russian spirit. It was possible, during the spring months, that the submarine campaign would shake the resolution of the Allies. But already the submarine has been assimilated to the ordinary sea risks. It represents merely a new percentage of wastage and tare, to be compensated by the increased efforts of which the Allied productive mechanism is quite capable. There is no longer any fear anywhere that England can be starved. Nor is there a belief that submarine operations will seriously interfere with the transport of American troops to France. If one of Pershing's troop ships had been lost the Germans might take heart. They all arrived in safety, and thousands more will get through the blockade.

The Germans have played against time and lost. Why then do they not cry quits? Because time will not be done with its assaults upon Germany when peace is restored. It is a common saying that if the war ends without a definite military decision, whatever the peace terms Germany will really be the victor. But this view takes no account of time. In Germany, where every statesman and political scientist has been reflecting for years upon what time has in store, an inconclusive peace means defeat. It means the destruction of the German hope not alone of becoming the foremost Power in the world, but of remaining one of the really great Powers.

Power, in the German sense, is an attribute of organized population and wealth. At the outbreak of the war Germany ranked high in power. Her population was inferior to those of Russia, the British Empire, and the United States, but superior organization made Germany more than a match for any one of these. Organization, however, is the monopoly of no people. In another half century of development the rivals of Germany will certainly have attained to a degree of organization that will make their resources for peace or war come much nearer matching Germany's, unit for unit. But this is not the point of chief concern to the Germans. What filled them with anxiety and ultimately drove them to war was a realization of the fact that Germany could not possibly keep pace with her three rivals in population and wealth. At the end of fifty years there may conceivably be one hundred millions of persons living within the present boundaries of the German Empire. There will be two hundred millions or more in European Russia, besides a huge population in Siberia. The United States will have two hundred millions and the already colossal population of the British Empire will have greatly increased, especially in its most competent elements, the white populations of the self-governing colonies. In a world of such immense empires Germany with her meagre hundred million cannot possibly count in the only way in which she now wishes to count, by virtue of might. That is why Germany must win now, if ever.

If the war had developed as Germany hoped, she would have acquired important stretches of territory on the west as well as on the east, to Germanize or to plant with true German population. Thus room might have been made for another 50,000,000 of population. Sections of Russian, Rumanian and Serbian territory would have been added to Austria-Hungary, the defense of which would have strained the forces of the Dual Empire to such an extent as to incline the statesmen of that Empire toward a permanent compact with Germany. Bulgaria would have been endowed with territories she could not hold without permanent German support, and thus might have been induced to abate her pretensions of militant nationalism sufficiently to accept German hegemony. Turkey, restored to control of Egypt and assured protection against Russian aggression, could readily have been drawn into the German imperial scheme. Thus a German imperial unit would have been established with a basis in territory and population, actual or potential, broad enough to maintain its position as a great Power against Russia, the British Empire and the United States.

All this was possible only on condition of victory. What was to hold this polyglot association of states together was common plunder and the common danger that the holding of such plunder would entail. But it becomes increasingly clear as the war goes on that there will be no common

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plunder. Turkey will not recover Egypt and she will almost certainly lose Mesopotamia; perhaps also Syria, Arabia and Armenia. Now that Russia has renounced Constantinople, however, and the association of Greece with the Allies offers a counterpoise to Italian claims in Asia Minor, the Turks must see a better possibility of retaining at least a shadow of empire by grace of Allied forbearance than through further reliance upon Germany. Even now there are rumors of a Turkish movement toward a separate peace with the Allies. We are likely to hear more of these rumors presently.

As for Austria-Hungary, her hopes for plunder must be growing faint indeed. It will be a miracle if the war ends without her losing territory to Italy, Serbia and perhaps to Rumania. She will not lose territory that will create in her people a permanent irredentist sentiment. What difference would it make to the Germans or Hungarians of Austria if Bosnia and Herzegovina were wrested from them? These had value only in relation to the Levantine dream they shared with Germany, and if the war fails to realize that dream the Austrians and Hungarians will be slow to place themselves at the discretion of Germany for a later attempt. As for Bulgaria, her legitimate territorial ambitions can easily be gratified by the Allies, if Serbia gains Bosnia and Herzegovina and some part of the Dalmatian coast. There would then be no further reason why Bulgaria should entrust her national sovereignty to Germany's keeping.

There is no peace in prospect that will leave Germany in the position of victor. All that Germany can hope for is to escape the humiliation of the vanquished. Such an escape will not further Germany's great design. It will not lay the foundations of a Central Europe under German hegemony. Austria-Hungary may recognize that Germany saved her from annihilation, but Austria-Hungary is proverbially ungrateful. She will not choose to place it in Germany's power to expose her to another chance of annihilation.

The vision of a German Empire to rank in population and power with the greatest in the world will not be realized in this war. It will not be realized in the succeeding period of peace. The antagonistic interests to be bound together are too numerous, and the only sure cement was the tremendous victory that time has denied. Germany will have to reconcile herself to a position that grows relatively weaker with the generations. She will have to look forward to a time when her security will be guaranteed not by her own military power but by a strengthened internationalism. But when Germany has become reconciled to internationalism the day of the aggressive great Power will be done. Time, in thwarting German ambition to become all-powerful, may make out of her the mighty champion of the rights of the lesser nations instead of their most dangerous foe. Neither Russia, England nor the United States will care to menace such a union of nationalities as Germany can form in the next half century if she will pursue the ways of liberalism and peace.

Our Food Problem

OUR food problem has become the food problem of the world. It will not automatically end with the war. If peace should come suddenly by negotiation or collapse of any belligerent, the need for a food administration in the United States would not be lessened but, on the contrary, greatly increased. To the already enormous pull on our reserves of grain and meat by those who are now our allies would be added the demands of those who are now our enemies, and the latter demands would be limited only by sheer incapacity to pay. Unless some kind of sharp control over exports were exercised, the competitive bidding of impoverished nations for our surplus would be certain to send domestic prices to unheard of figures.

For if statistics prove anything at all, they prove that the food-producing capacity of the world, since August, 1914, has sharply decreased. Compare the figures for 1913-14 with those of 1916-17 on practically any foodstuffs in practically any country —in the major food-raising countries the drop ranges from as low as 10 per cent to as high as 50 per cent. The gains are in small countries and infinitesimal when surveyed in view of the whole situation. This, too, in spite of the desperate efforts of all the belligerent countries to stimulate production, in spite of high prices that would normally tempt any neutral country to make profits from intensive agriculture. Our wheat crop is roughly estimated this year at 680,000,000 bushels, not a very high figure compared with bumper years; Canada's is rated at perhaps 250,000,000, also a poor average. Even British India's production of the staple rice for the last year is far below normal. South America loudly complains of her lack of any surplus for export. Russia's crop condition is unknown, but one of the important proximate causes of the revolution was the shortage of bread in the larger cities, and it seems extremely unlikely that so many millions of peasants could be called to the colors without numberless crops being left to rot in the fields. Accurate figures for Germany are unavailable, yet even with the help of thousands of docile and willing agri-

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cultural laborers in the Russian prisoners and with the acquisition of the rich Danube lowlands of Rumania, unbiased observers agree that her food situation is tragic.

The causes of this impoverishment are clustered around two chief phenomena—the war and the world-wide poor crop weather of the last three years. Typhoons, droughts, intense heat, dry spells, late frosts, all the perversities of climate have united in nation after nation to retard the ripening of grain. Other wars have brought destruction and ruin in their wake; the ravaging of invaded countries has dotted the pages of our school history books. All such conflicts, when now realistically surveyed, seem to have been almost localized battles. To-day the network of industrial and agricultural organization covers eight-tenths of the producing world, and it was the delicate balance wheel of this new international labor machinery which the war threw out of gear. Even in pacific countries the new industry of munition-making was subsidized by the hate of the belligerents. Millions of men were drawn from the fields to the tasks of destruction. In the fighting countries themselves much of the land was left in the care of those who before the war had been considered too old or too feeble to be of any vital importance to the state. Women already overburdened were given additional tasks in the fields. Prisoners, too, were set to ploughing and digging, although it must have been clear that they could hardly till the soil with the joy of its rightful owners. Fertilizer became scarce because of the chemical avarice of the shell factories. And the result was not only to lessen and slow up production, but actually to enfeeble the soil itself.

In view of this serious world situation, what is the task of the United States food administration? Our problem, unlike that of France and England and Italy, who have never for the last twenty years been wholly self-supporting, is not that of possible insufficiency of foodstuffs and consequent collapse. We are in no danger of starvation. Our impoverishment takes the form of a decreased surplus, and our problem is simply to increase that surplus. Allowing for a generous subsistence for ourselves, allowing for submarine losses and for possible bad weather before harvest, it may be stated—perhaps optimistically—that we, together with Canada, can supply France and England and Italy with about three-fourths of what they must have. Certainly any higher prediction would be bold. The only way the other one-quarter can be created from nothing is by the Allies paring their demands to the barest levels of necessity and by America voluntarily reducing consumption and eliminating waste. The main obligation for making the gain, however, will assuredly fall on us. Already the Allies have reduced their subsistence level dangerously close to that of human endurance.

By sharp control of exports leaks to Germany through neutral countries can be stopped. We must not forget our humanitarian duties to the neutrals, and it would be a serious mistake, political as well as economic, to drive them by starvation either into tacit or open alliance with the Central Powers. Furthermore, a control of exports will be highly efficacious in scotching the kind of competitive buying between the Allies in our open markets which has had so direct an effect on high prices. The chief administrative functions of the food administration board will probably center in the control of exports and the extirpation of speculation by middlemen so that artificial high prices may be lowered, but this closer rapprochement between market prices and the average workman's wage envelope will not, in spite of its good psychological effect, cure the real disease. That disease is an actual physical shortage of foodstuffs. Only by reducing our consumption can the cure be accomplished.

The Food Administration Board believes this necessary reduction can be brought about by the voluntary coöperation of the citizens of the United States. No coercion of any kind is planned. The process will be that of education and appeals to the patriotic efforts of housewives. So far as possible the administrative functions of this enormous nation-wide publicity task will be decentralized. The statistics and general survey upon which specific recommendations will be based are, of course, the concern of the federal bureau in Washington. But the actual carrying out of the proposals will be left to the already existing agencies of the Department of Agriculture in the various states and to voluntary organizations. Instructions about substitution, market values, vegetables in place of staples during the season, local products versus "imported" goods, will be the task of local committees. Recommendations will be based both on "zonal maps" of consumption in different sections of the country and upon agreed-upon statistics of America's most conspicuous wastes.

The waste in grain and meats is fairly large. It is proposed to recommend a reduction of wheat flour between 200 and 275 grams a day. For beef and pork is asked a reduction of only something like 25 grams. Bread is the barometer of food conditions, and the experience of Germany has shown that from the standpoint of the people there is no substitute for bread. Even in that homogeneous community the psychological effect of mixed bread on the people was too harmful to be

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worth the cost. Certainly no radical coercion of this nature could be attempted in the United States. But on the other hand we have the advantage of not being such bread-consumers as the European nations, and a slight substitution say of perishable vegetables or even corn bread would not be the hardship for us it would necessarily be for France and England where the traditions of the people and the mechanics of baking are adjusted to bread as the keystone of the dietary arch. The Food Administration Board will recommend the preparation of mixed flour for individual households and the use of whole wheat flour by those who like it. "Wheatless" meals and days are already common phrases. Our prospective crop of potatoes will luckily be large enough to warrant our increasing our daily consumption by something like four ounces. Little educative and patriotic propaganda will be necessary in many rural communities to cause these centers to double their consumption of perishable vegetables during the summer months. For the kind of food products which are necessary both for our Allies and for our own armies are first of all those products which are easily transportable—bread grains and packed meats, rich in fat.

The waste of fats is one of the most conspicuous wastes of the United States. Edible fat is the basis of soap, and it has been calculated that we use about twice as much soap in this country as is necessary for keeping us in a state of civilized cleanliness. To reduce the ingestion of animal fat by 10 grams a day will meet the present shortage, and it is felt that this can be accomplished by indirect rather than direct means. Yet because of the need for stimulating milk production it may be urged that the present per capita consumption of butter be maintained. If the consumption of cream can be lowered and the loss of skimmed milk eliminated, this disadvantage will be offset. For milk, like bread, is an indispensable ingredient in the preparation of food, and the supply of it could not be sharply curtailed without disastrous effects on the kitchen economy of millions of households. No sociologist has to point out the humanitarian necessity of keeping the supply of milk normal for children, the aged and the sick. But it cannot be doubted that the large consumption of milk as a beverage by adults in America more or less competes with the consumption of milk by children. This kind of luxurious consumption ought to be lowered.

The problem of another basic staple, sugar, is again a problem in reduction of consumption. We consume an average of nearly 100 grams a day, and the latest available statistics tend to show that it will soon be physically impossible to supply more than 75 grams. If anywhere there is a possibility of reduced consumption without serious hardship, it is in sugar. The luxurious consumption of candies and cakes and soft-drink syrups in America is enormous. An appeal to reduce this kind of consumption will awaken a generous response. It is essentially the type of wastefulness which can be easily dramatized for the general public. One can anticipate the glee of our professional humorists at so fertile a topic. There will be "kicks," but most of them will be good-humored.

Ultimately the success of this whole scheme of voluntary rationing will depend upon effective publicity and the success of the Board in reducing the present inflated prices. There is a tremendous fund of latent goodwill to be utilized. Provided the control of distribution and the killing of speculation have a happy effect on prices, the gratitude of the people will give to voluntary retrenchment the quality of a duty. The traditional individualism of America will not then be able seriously to injure the plan. But the issues must be kept clear, and in each state the food administration volunteers will have to consider the local problems. One hundred per cent success cannot be expected. Patience, tact, a knowledge of psychology, all the factors of organizing genius will have to be exhibited by the Food Administration Board if this scheme of voluntary reduction of consumption is to succeed. All this is a good deal to ask of a body of merely human men and women. Yet it is not asking more, proportionally, than they are asking of a nation rooted in individualism and not accustomed to concerted voluntary action for a common end.

Losing Our First Trenches

WE are fighting for democracy, otherwise our war has neither rhyme nor reason. We are fighting for the democratic rights of other nations: of Russia, France and England, Belgium and Serbia, Italy and Rumania; but not for this alone. Our own democracy would be endangered by the realization of the German plans. They are plans endowed with the character of indefinite expansibility. This war won, Germany would rest until she had gathered strength for the next forcible advance toward world power, and the next. Eventually we should find ourselves lying squarely across the path of German ambition. We should have to prepare against disaster, and at an early date. We should have to militarize ourselves, bend our necks to coercion, reshape our civil institutions primarily with a view to military efficiency. That would be the end of such democ-

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racy as we already have. Our hopes for a better democracy in the future would best be abandoned. Such is the argument of our belligerency, and it is unassailable.

But democracy in America is in process, not in final perfection. We have won a higher degree of personal freedom, a higher measure of personal opportunity than the people of any other great nation in history. This is our heritage, but it does not rest in our hands like an estate held in fee simple, protected by an all-powerful law. Democracy holds what democracy defends, and in time of crisis the defense requires vigilance and effort. Democracy is being assailed in France and Belgium, on the Russian front and in the Balkans. It is also being assailed here in the United States. Is it winning or losing? To be candid, it looks as if the first trenches were being lost.

All over the country the basis is being laid for war fortunes. When our soldiers return from Europe, stripped for the most part of everything but honor, they will find that a new class of enriched civilians has been injected into the body politic, equipped with the economic power that makes an individual everywhere count for more than one. An era of war prices is upon us. Our steel industry was prosperous when its leading products commanded forty dollars a ton. They now command a hundred dollars and more. War prices for copper, coal, petroleum products, foodstuffs, leather goods, textiles, yield hundreds of millions in profits. This is not wealth new made, but wealth collected from the many and poured into the laps of the few. We knew that this drive of war prices was coming, but our government has proved, and still proves as impotent to check it as the Allies were impotent to check the German drive through Belgium.

Perhaps we are face to face with a natural economic law, to which even sovereign peoples must yield mute obedience? No. The democracy of Great Britain, quite as convinced as we have ever been of the supremacy of natural economic laws, has succeeded in breaking the force of war speculation in conditions much more difficult than our own. Soaring prices for sugar were predictable when the Germans first crossed the Belgian frontier. Straightway the British government prepared to corner the sugar stocks and to take charge of importations, thus placing itself in a position to regulate the prices even to the retail trade. If the prices were fixed at a high level, the profits fell to the state. Since then, to quote from Sidney Webb in the current Atlantic, "the British government has successively assumed the control of the railways and mines, of all the flour mills, of all the merchant shipping, and of all the munition factories; it has taken over all the wool, leather, copper and other raw materials. . . . And wherever the government controls the supply, it fixes in one way or another both the wholesale and the retail price of the commodity, so as to limit the advantage that any dealer can take of the urgent needs of the consumer."

Perhaps we shall achieve comparable results in the regulation of food, although we are waiting and wasting while the speculators store their harvests. Perhaps we shall eventually reach a solution of the problem of coal prices, which yield half a billion in excess profits for each four weeks of our delay. Still, shall we not through taxation recover for the state much of the excessive war profits?

As the rates of profits tax now stand in the Senate bill, there is no effective check upon colossal earnings. Not until profits reach the impossible figure of 250 per cent in excess of peace-time averages does the tax take so much as one-half of the profit. Not one-half of the 250 per cent, but one-half of the amount over that figure. No part of an excess profit of 50 per cent will be taxed above 20 per cent. A corporation earning $100,000 in the pre-war period and $150,000 now would pay taxes of 12 per cent on $15,000, 16 per cent on $10,000 and 20 per cent on $25,000, or $8,400 in all. On a corresponding excess profit a British corporation would pay $30,000. On enormous profits, it is true, the American tax is not greatly inferior to the British. It is 50 per cent as compared with the British 60 per cent. But in most actual cases the excess profits will fall within 50 per cent. That is enough, in view of the low rate of taxation, to give rise to mushroom fortunes.

True, we have another chance at recovering the profits of war through the income tax. But here again we have failed to impose drastic taxes, and have provided means of evasion through tax-exempt bonds. As in the matter of price control, so in the matter of taxation we are losing our first trenches.

War prices fall heavily upon all classes, but most heavily upon the workers, whose standard of life can be lowered only at grievous cost to real democracy. Some advance in prices is inevitable in wartime, and the only remedy available is increased wages. We cannot permit the application of the usual method of forcing advance in wages, the strike. If the lot of labor is not to become progressively worse in time of war, we must have a flexible organization of representatives of the employers and of the workers, under governmental auspices, to arrange for indispensable additions to wages. Such an organization Great Britain has. It does not work perfectly, but it has secured

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advances that, according to Mr. Webb, amount to between 20 and 25 per cent of the pre-war averages. What are we doing in this direction? Next to nothing. Since we entered the war food and other necessities have gone up in price by about 25 per cent. But we are depending almost wholly upon the free play of competition to effect readjustment of wages, although we know from past experience that free competition always leaves wages lagging behind in the upward trend of prices. We are exploiting the prestige of Mr. Gompers and other labor leaders to deliver us from the embarrassment of strikes, while permitting forces inimical to labor organization to reconquer their lost provinces. In this vital field also, democracy appears to be losing its first trenches.

In time we shall recover them, no doubt. The future of the world belongs to democracy. But it is one thing to meet the enemy resolutely at the gates and another thing to expel him after he has entrenched. It is the latter labor, the desperate labor, that our political incompetence is preparing for us.

The Helpless City

AGAIN a strike is threatened on the street railways of New York City. Hundreds of disaffected men have been holding mass meetings to protest against conditions which they allege are intolerable. They assert that their wages are not only far below the wages paid for similar service in such cities as Boston, Chicago and Detroit, but are actually insufficient to feed and clothe their families. At a recent meeting, one man said that his "swings" had covered seventeen hours in twenty-four; others claimed that their schedules kept them on call fifteen hours in the day. The men protest that they do not want to go on strike, but that the companies are forcing the issue. Last week they formulated demands for a reasonable increase in wages and a work day of ten hours to be completed within twelve consecutive hours. The members of the committee who signed these demands were summarily discharged for insubordination, although the company gave color of justice to the demands by immediately announcing a voluntary increase in wages. Other men have been discharged on suspicion of having joined the union. The men insist that if they go on strike it will be because the companies deny them any other remedy.

A strike on the street railways of New York City is a matter of grave concern not only to the local community but to the entire nation. An interruption of street car service in the shipping and manufacturing center of the country would inevitably hamper many industries upon which the government is depending for the production and prompt delivery of essential supplies. It is readily conceivable that it might more than hamper them. The industrial population of the city is in a state of abnormal nervous tension. It has been harassed by the protracted and growing pressure of the cost of living. Strikes for higher wages have become increasingly frequent. The impending draft will intensify the emotional strain. A strike on the street railways, which would throw the lives of millions of people into confusion, might conceivably touch off an explosion followed by the complete paralysis of the city's industrial life.

The municipal and state authorities appreciate the menace of the situation. Chairman Straus of the Public Service Commission has given out a statement in which he appeals to both sides to find an amicable settlement of their grievances. "At this time," he says, "when all patriotic Americans have but one dominant thought and purpose in view, viz.: to marshal the military and economic forces of the country to down the enemy of democracy, it would be most unfortunate if at this, the chief port of the country, there should be a strike on the transportation system." The memory of the strike which crippled the surface lines for two months last year, brought the companies—according to their own statements—to the verge of bankruptcy, cost thousands of men their jobs and inflicted incalculable damage upon the business community is still fresh in everyone's mind. But the authorities are powerless to avert a repetition of the disaster. Under the law the Public Service Commission has no right to concern itself with the conditions of employment until they result in an interruption of service. The Mayor, as chief magistrate of the city, has no power to intervene unless conditions arise that endanger the safety of the public. It is as if the medical authorities had no power to take cognizance of infectious diseases until they had become epidemic. Our laws are strangely blind to the human side of industry. The Public Service Commission has power to supervise construction, to regulate schedules, to adjust rates; the city has power to place millions of money at the disposal of the companies and to grant or withold franchises. But under the law, no state or municipal authority has power to deal with the human element upon whom the operation of the public utilities depends. Unless the men strike, the conditions under which they work are none of the public's affairs. The power of the franchise-holders, so far as the law goes, is absolute.

How absolute this power is and how dangerous

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to the public welfare is shown by the record of last year's strike and the present threat of its recurrence. Early in August, 1916, it became apparent that the companies had lost control of their men, that the strikers were in a position to tie up the lines. Immediately, the Mayor and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission intervened, as they had the right to do, *after* the strike was in full swing. Through a series of conferences, they managed to induce the representatives of both sides to sign an arbitration agreement, known as the agreement of August sixth. This agreement stipulated that the employees had the legal and moral right to organize; that the companies would receive and treat with committees of their employees; that these committees were free to select such spokesmen or advisers as they might choose; that questions of wages, hours and other working conditions should be taken up by committees of the employees with the officials of the companies; and that all questions upon which the two parties could not agree should be submitted to a board of arbitration whose award should be final and binding. As representatives of the public, the Mayor and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission underwrote this agreement and made themselves its guarantors.

But within a few days, and before the machinery of the agreement had been put into operation, the companies required the men as individuals to sign individual contracts binding them to work for wages and hours fixed by the companies, although these were matters expressly reserved for joint conference and arbitration by the agreement of August sixth. The men immediately charged the companies with bad faith and demanded the withdrawal of the individual contracts. The companies refused. The men renewed their strike. The companies then took the position that this strike nullified the agreement. The men asked that the controversy should be submitted to arbitration. Again the companies refused. The Mayor, the Public Service Commission, committees of citizens appealed to the companies to honor their moral obligation under their agreement. Meanwhile, however, the companies had been recruiting strike-breakers from all parts of the country. They felt that they now had the upper hand. They accordingly served notice on the Mayor and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission to mind their own business and keep hands off. That these representatives of the public were powerless to enforce an agreement which they themselves had signed, and that the Mayor was bound by law to use the police force of the city to support the companies in their violation of the agreement was an unspeakably humiliating demonstration of the city's helplessness.

That was a year ago. To-day, the city is as helpless to protect itself against a repetition of the catastrophe as it was then. Debarred from the properties of the companies, in so far as the conditions of employment are concerned, it has no way of knowing whether the men have just grievances or not. The men insist that conditions are worse than those which brought on the strike a year ago. The companies, instead of inviting investigation, call the men who voice these complaints "irresponsible agitators." One daily paper has aroused their indignation by referring to them as agents of a German plot. There is already a labor shortage; this shortage will be increased when the draft goes into effect. Unless both sides meet the situation in a spirit of patriotism, a strike with all its attendant evils to the city and the nation seems inevitable. Does not the spirit of patriotism suggest the wisdom of reviving the arbitration agreement of last year?

Sermons in Freight Cars

DEMAND and Supply are the twin guardian angels of the competitive economic system. For years conventional economists have shown how neatly the two help each other to replenish wants, provided you leave individualistic enterprise free to serve them. Demand always brings Supply in his train, and Supply always assuages Demand, at a reasonable and necessary price. This is eternal and immutable law—according to the bibles of laissez-faire.

For several years before the war there were so many freight cars available that in October, 1914, the American Railway Association suspended compiling the figures for four months. Then war industry began suddenly to boom. September, 1916, brought demands for 18,873 cars above the supply. By May 1st the apparent shortage was 148,627. Consequent high prices of merchandise and acute distress are being reported from all over the country. Minnesota has millions of bushels of grain already sold which cannot be moved. The Northern Pacific Railroad has warned the public that it can carry only a small part of the State of Washington's crops, and has urged the erection of frost-proof warehouses against next winter. What has happened to economic law?

Under the orthodox process, of course, the railroads would have sent out large rush orders for new cars. These orders would have had to compete in the steel and lumber markets with the enormous prices caused by the production of war materials. The cost of freight cars would double and treble, but the railroads would pay it because of the urgency of shippers, and would charge the ship-

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pers correspondingly higher rates. Eventually the whole burden would be transferred to the public, plus large profits for all those along the line who would have been enabled to demand extra tribute because of the crisis. The cost of living would again rise, and all those with small fixed incomes would suffer.

But at one crucial point the government had already interrupted this comfortable process. The railroads cannot raise their rates without permission. Public policy demands that the profits of common carriers be limited, because they serve everybody in a fundamental way. Therefore the railroads have not accumulated profit enough to be able to compete in the markets with the large profiteers. They have not been able to pay for enough freight cars. The resulting car shortage, plus the railroads' request for permission to raise rates, has caused a careful investigation of the whole matter.

Now appears a decided lack of neatness in the competitive scheme, which was unsuspected by the older theorists. The stated shortage of freight cars is compiled on the basis of the requests for cars. These requests come from shippers who often file duplicate orders or orders with several different lines to care for the same shipment, knowing that, on account of the shortage, cars are likely to be refused on one or more of the routes. The shipment in question frequently represents goods not yet on hand, although ordered by the consumer, for competition leads shippers to be forehanded. The orders for goods are often duplicates, for the scarcity of commodities prompts consumers to order the same materials from several sources at once, hoping thus to secure the full amount of their needs. Therefore the original demand for commodities is likely to be doubled several times over before it appears in the freight-car statistics. The extreme complexity of the situation makes it impossible to estimate at once the discrepancy between actual and apparent shortage, but for all we know three cars may be demanded to move each carload of goods; and it is certain that cars are furnished where they are less needed, increasing the deficiency elsewhere.

But this is only the beginning of the confusion. Shippers make a practice of taking their own time about loading and unloading, holding cars until they can be loaded according to brands and trade names, and using them for storage purposes. On March 30th there were 89,371 cars standing idle all over the country, unavailable on account of just such use. Various economy and efficiency methods in the use of cars and locomotives by the railroads themselves would, according to estimates of the Special Committee of National Defense, increase the available supply, without any outlay of capital, by 779,000 cars, or 30 per cent of the whole. Rearrangement of assembling yards, distributing points, warehouses, elevators and terminal facilities would also go far to decrease the congestion—for these matters have been determined not by the coöperative need of the whole but by the demands of the several competitors.

It is on the lack of coöperation among railroads, shippers and consignees that the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Coöperative Committee on Transportation, and the Car Service Commission have concentrated their attention. A sample of what they can do is the pooling arrangement effected between coal operators, railroads, mines and lake vessels whereby coal from the Lake Erie ports destined for the head of the lakes will be classified and handled so much more efficiently that the equivalent of 52,000 cars will be added to the equipment. Similar arrangements are under negotiation elsewhere. The application of regulated priority is relieving the situation so rapidly that the June shortage figures have dropped off to 105,127 cars. Some new cars will, of course, be necessary, but most of them will probably be built according to national needs at restricted prices.

The moral is clear. A laissez-faire economic system under the conditions of competition sprawled out into incredible waste. The supply of freight cars, if left to itself, would have met the demand, if at all, only at an enormous cost to the public. Now, enforced coöperation and regulation under national necessity will squeeze out much of the waste, tend to cut off unwarranted profits, and do its bit to lighten the whole pyramid of high prices under which the people are staggering. The twin godhead of Demand and Supply has demonstrated its need of aid from a little human intelligence.

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Conscience and Compulsion

THOSE in contact with youth know that a considerable number have undergone a serious moral strain in the weeks since war was declared by the United States. Much larger numbers have had to make a moral adjustment which if not involving a tragedy of the inner life has been effected only with some awkward trampling of what has been cherished as the finer flowers of the soul. And how could it have been otherwise? I doubt if any propaganda has ever been carried on with greater persistence or with greater success—so far as affecting feelings was concerned—than that for peace during the decade prior to 1914. The times were so ripe that the movement hardly had to be pushed. Our remoteness from the immediate scene of international hatreds, the bad aftertaste from the Spanish-American war, the contentment generated by successful industrialism, the general humanitarianism of which political progressivism was as much a symptom as social settlements, the gradual substitution of calculating rationalism for the older romantic patriotism—all of these things and many more fell in with that general spirit of goodwill which is essential America, to create a sense of war as the supreme stupidity. War came. But there persisted the feeling that it was " over there " and that we at peace were the preservers of sanity in a world gone mad. Some of the phrases used in this sense by President Wilson gave great offense to our present allies, but they were the phrases which best expressed the average American feeling.

At last we were in it ourselves. And is it strange that thousands of young people who had taken the peace movement with moral seriousness found themselves upset? Already an attempt is making to befog the past. It is intimated that our ante-bellum pacifism was a compound of sentimentality, cowardice and a degenerate materialism bred of excessive comfort. Nothing could be further from the truth. Current pacifism was identified with good business, philanthropy, morality and religion. Combine Mr. Carnegie and Mr. Bryan and you have as near the typical American as you are likely to find. Especially is it true that the churches took up the cause of peace as a great moral issue. Clergymen obliged to shun political issues because they were so closely linked with struggle for economic power gladly added peace to divorce and temperance as subjects which were safe and also " live." The American habit of discussing political questions in a moral vocabulary found full scope with peace and war. In our colleges the Y. M. C. A.'s were even more ardent promoters of peace sentiments than were intercollegiate socialist clubs.

We are not an over-agile people morally. No one has yet depicted the immense moral wrench involved in our passage from friendly neutrality to participation in war. I hardly believe the turnover could have been accomplished under a leadership less skilful than that of President Wilson, so far as he succeeded in creating the belief that just because the pacific moral impulse retained all its validity Germany must be defeated in order that it find full fruition. That was a bridge on which many a conscience crossed with no greater dexterity in balancing than conscience frequently finds necessary. But there were many who still had doubts, qualms, clouds of bewilderment. How could wrong so suddenly become right? Among the questioners were many whom we are wont to term idealistic, men and women who have the most difficulty in identifying the conventional and the popular with the right and good. And it is among these that there was enacted a genuine tragedy when the impulse to loyalty, to service, to unity came into conflict with their moral abhorrence of war, which they had learned to look upon as murder, and murder of a peculiarly stupid sort. Conscription did not originate the crisis in moral experience, but it brought it acutely to a focus.

I can but think that such young people deserve something better than accusations, varying from pro-Germanism and the crime of Socialism to traitorous disloyalty, which the newspapers so readily " hurl " at them—to borrow their own language. Nor does it quite cover the ground to urge that genuinely conscientious objectors be given that work, when they are drafted, which will put the least heavy load possible upon their consciences. The country ought to be great enough in spirit as it is great enough in men and in the variety of tasks to be performed to make this a matter of course. But it is to be feared that if local tribunals take their cue from current newspaper objurgations they will regard it as their duty to punish the objectors as dangerous malefactors instead of asking to what tasks they may most usefully be assigned. It is not, however, the problem of practical administration that I raise, but the nature of the moral education which has been revealed in our American aversion to war and in the ways in which persons perplexed by the coercions of wartime have met their dilemmas. For at the very worst most of these young people appear to

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me victims of a moral innocency and an inexpertness which have been engendered by the moral training which they have undergone.

It is perhaps a penalty which we have paid for our unusual development of good nature and goodwill that our moral training emphasizes the emotions rather than intelligence, ideals rather than specific purposes, the nurture of personal motives rather than the creation of social agencies and environments. The tendency to dispose of war by bringing it under the commandment against murder, the belief that by *not* doing something, by keeping out of a declaration of war, our responsibilities could be met, a somewhat mushy belief in the existence of disembodied moral forces which require only an atmosphere of feelings to operate so as to bring about what is right, the denial of the efficacy of force, no matter how controlled, to modify disposition; in short, the inveterate habit of separating ends from means and then identifying morals with ends thus emasculated, such things as these are the source of much of the perplexity of conscience from which idealistic youth has suffered. The evangelical Protestant tradition has fostered the tendency to locate morals in personal feelings instead of in the control of social situations, and our legal tradition has bred the habit of attaching feelings to fixed rules and injunctions instead of to social conditions and consequences of action as these are revealed to the scrutiny of intelligence.

I am not concerned to argue that a different method of dealing with moral issues, a more social and less personal and evangelical method, would have brought all our perplexed idealists to decide that our share in the war is righteous and conscription a necessary part of the means of making our share effective. But I do know that it would result in giving weight to considerations of an order now mostly neglected, and would have taken the problem out of the emotional urgencies and inhibitions of inner consciousness into the light of objective facts. I may perhaps indicate the nature of the change by a quotation that I recently ran across: "In the past ten thousand saints working with their hands could not make as many enameled bricks as two sinners working with present machinery can now turn out." The comparison of hands with personal virtues and of physical machinery for making bricks with social mechanisms for sustaining peace presents itself, I hope, without elaboration from me. It is, however, too favorable to the efficacy of merely personal morality in a situation like the present; for hands are physical machinery—forces, as far as they go; while personal good feeling even of the most ardent kind toward the wounded, dying and starving of Europe begins and ends in itself. The more one loves peace (of course I do not mean by peace the mere absence of military war) the more one is bound to ask himself how the machinery, the specific, concrete social arrangements, exactly comparable to physical engineering devices, for maintaining peace, are to be brought about. Conscience proceeding on this basis would operate very differently from that whose main concern is to maintain itself unspotted within, or from that whose search is for a fixed antecedent rule of justification. One of my most depressing experiences in connection with this matter was the number of young men who when war was actually declared merely clumsily rolled their conscience out from under the imperative of "Thou shalt not kill" till it settled under the imperative of "Obey the law," although they still saw the situation exactly as they had seen it before.

One pities suffering, and the suffering of a perplexed and resentful overridden conscience is really suffering. One pities victims. But the fact that the merely good, the merely conscientious, are the victims in every social crisis should lead us to inquire whether they are not the victims of moral futility. If at a critical juncture the moving force of events is always too much for conscience, the remedy is not to deplore the wickedness of those who manipulate events. Such a conscience is largely self-conceit. The remedy is to connect conscience with the forces that are moving in another direction. Then will conscience itself have compulsive power instead of being forever the martyred and the coerced.

JOHN DEWEY.

Progress—1917

IF a Victorian Rip Van Winkle were to wake up tomorrow morning after forty or fifty years of uninterrupted slumber, he would find it comparatively easy to accustom himself to safety razors, electric lights, and moving pictures, but he would be hopelessly at sea in the ideological currents of the new day. The war has destroyed not only men, money or goods—it is no great problem to restock the world with these—but ideas. A faith has withered, a faith that the Victorian held as firmly as he held that two and two made four. The Victorian worshipped before the shrine of a secular deity of progress. He had taken over what he thought was Darwinism or Spencerism, and found the world as simple as a watch, and the purposes of the creator—or rather the creative forces—as plain as a watch crystal. In his eyes humanity and human institutions were

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steadily growing better through an evolutionary process not dissimilar from that by which the anthropoid ape had lost his tail. He could look forward along a path of progress so well engineered, with such perfect curves and gradients, that humanity could stroll along it, day by day, without consciousness of effort. Generations of respectable people, getting up at half-past six or seven, breakfasting on coffee, rolls and bacon, going to an office, coming home at six o'clock, bringing up children, not being conspicuously unhappy with their wives, tinkering, but not radically, with old ideas and old ways, were expected to lead mankind upward and onward toward the divine —Galahads with mufflers and cough drops, crusaders with money invested in commissary contracts.

The Victorian did not feel at home in a world which retained the institution of war, and accordingly was convinced that wars were becoming less and less frequent, retreating to less and less conspicuous corners of the earth, and on the point of being whirled off altogether. Wars were bad morally and bad for business, two objections, overlapping slightly, which seemed the best kind of insurance. The great body of knowledge which men were weaving into a bridle to put on nature was international. Scientists met in world conferences and felt more akin to their colleagues in foreign lands than to the next-door neighbors who had no specialties or whose specialties were different from their own. Almost every human interest had its international association. Internationalism was reputable, except, perhaps, in Germany. Christendom threatened to have a meaning for the first time since Pope Innocent the Great. The world was undeniably growing smaller and better. It was better at two o'clock than at noon, and better at a quarter after two than at two. It grew better while the Victorians were eating, while they were sleeping, and while they were amusing themselves. They were passengers on a limited train of betterment.

Such was their confidence in the ameliorative process that they believed it went on and would go on, automatically, that it required no summers of hell, no winters of unendurable anguish, no decades of hatred and remorse. It was here that their faith showed its weakness. It did not make a sufficient demand for heroism. It was a philosophy of padded furniture, of carpets, of shutters pulled to lest the carpets fade, of windows closed lest the inmates catch cold, of umbrellas, overshoes, corsets, and a regulated diet. In contemplative moments it could not have given satisfaction. The Victorian must have lain awake in the darkness of night and shivered at what might lie outside the locked gates and inside the secret closets; or been dazzled by irrepressible gleams of light through the most carefully plastered crevices. He must have heard the pound of horses' feet in the streets at midnight and the knock of heavy hands upon his doors; must have smelled the sea salt, though never so far inland; must have felt himself lonely and old when spring winds went by him and he did not follow; must have guessed at times that the great streams of life were foaming all about him and that he was not in them or of them; and must have waked in the morning to be cross over his breakfast. For him there was no escape from the hideous safety in which his life was muffled. He could not live dangerously or die heroically, for there seemed no practical purpose to be served by doing so, and he was above all else a practical man. He could not go out as knight errant or suffer himself to be burned at the stake in defense of a reasoned conviction that the world was, on the whole, growing better. It would have been silly, and above all things he dreaded being silly.

The rising tides of the new age have swept away nearly all of the Victorians. Those who survive are foreigners in their native lands, their ears constantly assailed by an alien speech, their own words ignored or misunderstood, they are the most pathetic of men. When they try to bring the younger generation to a sense of its errors, they find that there is no common currency of ideas between them, no agreement about fundamentals. The stern young men of the new age have as little use for Victorian platitudes as for Don Quixote's books of chivalry. Victorianism was essentially a thing of curtains and conventions, but, for them, all curtains are torn down and all conventions are called upon to stand and deliver. In place of religion smothered under a padded philosophy of clothes they demand one that is naked and unashamed. They have life and they have it abundantly, in all its beauty and horror. A schoolmaster that their fathers never knew has taught them his lessons well, and they have learned them in a mental and bodily agony of which it was once not thought decent to speak aloud. Ten million men have perished to prove that progress is not automatic, not comfortable, and not in any way a law of nature; even more, that there are dark forces that tear at the fabric of civilization as fast as it is woven. The chaotic stuff of the old nations, governments and societies, torn into threads, must pass again through the brains and fingers of mankind, and these straining shuttles must give it form again. No longer pen-

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sioners of providence, made to be coddled, petted and amused, but responsible beings, charged with the same creative energy which set the planets whirling, the young men of 1917 are condemned to earn their peace of mind by unceasing struggle. Theirs are to be great sorrows and great adventures, theirs stony beds and sight of the morning sun, theirs deliverance from safety and monotony. This they are to receive—and pay for.

No wonder the Victorian cannot understand them, nor they him. He seems far away and dim, a figure in the fog with an umbrella. They would be more at home with the men of Shakespere's England or the French of Peter the Hermit, though their crusading paths are whiter with young men's bones than ever Peter's were, and their books are written in blood.

R. L. DUFFUS.

Conscription of Income Once More

THE policy of meeting the costs of the war mainly by means of taxation during its progress, outlined in The New Republic of February 24th, 1917, has received the approval of a very large number of economists throughout the country. The position which they have taken found expression shortly after the declaration of war in a memorial to Congress in which they urged the immediate imposition of heavy taxation, especially on incomes and excess profits. It is significant, however, that two economists, Professor Seligman of Columbia and Professor Bullock of Harvard, are strongly opposed to this policy.

In matters relating to policies of permanent taxation most of the economists of the country would readily admit the superior competence of these distinguished experts. If, then, the ordinary economist has not been greatly impressed by the views which they have expressed on war finance, the reason is not far to seek. The financing of the present war is a matter regarding which no one can pretend to possess the knowledge and authority of an expert. It is the function of the expert to apply knowledge acquired from past experience to situations which are not very unlike those from which that experience was derived. But the requirements of the present war are so unprecedentedly large and various that those considerations, which would be decisive in shaping a taxation policy in time of peace or during a war in which a slight part of the economic forces of a community is engaged, lose much of their force and may be positively misleading when applied to the present situation.

In formulating a wise policy of war finance, it is first of all necessary to gain a clear understanding of the vast changes which must be made in the economic activities of the country if the war is to be prosecuted effectively. Both Professor Seligman and Professor Bullock have failed to analyze the nature and extent of these changes, and consequently it is not surprising that they hold that onerous taxation imposed at the outset of the war will have disastrous consequences. With little or no qualification they apply to war finance the tests which they have been accustomed to apply, and properly, to proposals for permanent taxation in times of peace. Thus, Professor Bullock observes at the end of an article in the June issue of the North American Review: "In an emergency like this we can rely to a certain extent upon patriotism and to a certain extent upon the penalties of the law. But nothing except the prospect of profit will call forth that degree of enterprise and efficiency which is necessary if private revenues are to be large and both public and private wants are to be fully supplied."

Professor Seligman in widely circulated pamphlets bids us beware of attempting to raise more than $1,500,000,000 by taxes during the current year, and advises only $1,250,000,000. He fears that heavy taxes on consumption will cause popular resentment, that taxes on industry will dampen the spirit of enterprise, and is also alarmed lest heavy taxes on income may deplete the surplus available for investments, cause a diminution in educational and other philanthropic benevolences, and diminish our ability to endure heavy taxation later on.

These objections to onerous war taxation imply distrust of the spirit of the people and are entirely unsupported by proof drawn from the experience of nations at war. Nothing surely can be more groundless than the fear that consumption taxes will occasion popular resentment. A people which at the beginning of the war has adopted the selective draft can be relied upon to face some deprivation of comforts and luxuries. Readiness to make sacrifices on account of the war is everywhere manifest. There can be no more opportune moment for the imposition of an adequate measure of taxation. Popular resentment among those with small incomes to whom consumption taxes would

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be burdensome is only to be feared in the event of a failure to impose taxes which will call for a positive sacrifice from those in receipt of large incomes and especially from those who reap large profits during the war. But at this point we are warned by our professorial experts that to attempt this will dampen the spirit of enterprise and work against the continuance of a high degree of efficiency in the conduct of business. Enterprise and efficiency in the conduct of the economic activities of the country we must have if the war is to be carried to a successful conclusion. But as regards enterprise it is not to be assumed that more of this quality is needed than in times of peace, and it is certain that unlimited profits and light income taxes will work positively against the realization of maximum industrial efficiency.

During the next twelve months it is estimated that the government will expend, on its own account and that of our Allies, something like ten billions of dollars. This is a sum which vastly exceeds the normal savings made year by year within the country. Only as a result of abnormal economy in consumption on the part of the people generally will it be forthcoming. Evidently then there will be no appreciable amount of capital available for new investments during the war, except in those industries an increase in the products of which is indispensible for military purposes. We must perforce rely mainly upon existing plant and equipment, which so far as possible must be utilized in the production of military supplies. The development of undertakings such as hydro-electric enterprises, which require much capital, must come to a complete standstill. But it is precisely in connection with undertakings of this character that the spirit of enterprise and readiness to assume risks for the sake of large business profits are most essential.

For making effective use of capital already invested administrative ability of a high order rather than enterprise is the primary requirement, and in securing the services of men possessing such ability, unlimited profits during the war are not indispensable. Even in times of peace much of the best administrative work is performed by salaried officials of corporations. Moreover, those engaged in business on their own account, even though profits are heavily taxed, will still have adequate inducements to maintain the highest possible degree of efficiency in the conduct of their affairs. Each business man will be concerned to keep his organization in good working order, so that it may be in shape to take advantage of the opportunities for profitable business which will come with the return of peace. The effects of heavy temporary taxes during a war, it may be repeated, are quite dissimilar from those which follow the imposition of heavy permanent taxation.

Industrial efficiency, it is also to be noted, does not depend upon the management alone. Already workmen are being asked to work longer hours and to sacrifice arrangements which they consider of vital importance. Is it reasonable to expect the workman to make these concessions, when he hears the doctrine preached and perhaps put into effect in legislation, that the only means of securing efficient management is to refrain from imposing heavy taxes upon those in receipt of large incomes and huge business profits? Consumption taxes, income and excess profit taxes, service in the armies and strenuous labor by workmen, are all various forms of sacrifice which will aid in the one common object of winning the war. Each particular sacrifice will be more easy if the other burdens are not being evaded.

The policy of heavy war taxation has been termed the conscription of income. This expression does not imply a sacrifice which is the equivalent of that made by those who are drawn for military service. Military service is one obligation of the citizen. The phrase "conscription of income" calls attention to another obligation—the obligation to finance war, so far as may be, by the sacrifice of income and, as in the case of military service, without hope of reward.

Conscription of men is a wise policy because it is the most certain method of securing an adequate number of men for military service with the least disturbance of the industrial activities of the country. An analogous advantage may be derived from the conscription of income. It will greatly facilitate the transfer of labor and capital to those uses which are of most importance for the successful prosecution of the war. Much additional labor, for example, has been and is still needed in agriculture. There is an abnormally large demand for food products, and we can not safely rely upon the ordinary working out of competitive force to secure the production of adequate supplies. The pull of the intense urban demand for labor is too strong to be overcome by the demand from the farms. Taxation sufficiently heavy to reduce sharply the demand for comforts and luxuries, most of which are produced in the cities, would set free labor which would then become available for agriculture and the production of military supplies. Conscription of income would greatly facilitate the mobilization of the country for war. This is the positive and fundamental reason for the immediate adoption of the policy of drastic taxation, in other words, for the conscription of income.

OLIVER M. W. SPRAGUE.

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Wooden Ships

THERE is positively no component part of a wooden steamship that has failed to supply an argument in recent months as to the impracticability of building a thousand wooden ships. The most crushing argument applies to the wooden ship as a whole. If the wooden ship is slow, is it not simple madness to feed one after another into the jaws of the U-boat? But aside from this scornful inquiry, there are a hundred others brought up to reveal the utter futility of discussing wooden ship construction at the present time.

The fact that General Goethals has already made contracts for wooden ships of both the Hough and the Ferris designs, and that 250 vessels of this character are believed to be scheduled by the General, does not in the least retard destructive criticism. One man will tell you that wooden ships would be all right if you could caulk them, but there are not enough caulkers to be found in the United States, and the result will be the inevitable leaking of every wooden ship that is launched, and its early descent somewhere about mid-Atlantic to a watery grave. Another man will ignore caulking, but will speak tragically of engines. There are too few engines in the United States. Another man will pay no attention to the number of engines but will ask with great earnestness, "Won't the engines rack wooden ships all to pieces in no time?" The feeling that people have about wooden railroad cars as compared with steel railroad cars, or wooden houses as compared with stone houses, or wooden spoons as compared with metal spoons, seems to be carried unfailingly over to the appraisement of wooden ships, and the scheme for a thousand wooden ships meets with consequent frowns of hesitation, doubt and disapproval.

Considering the novelty of the project itself, let alone its nature, there are few people in this country or in England who are entitled to speak with authority on it. Certainly no reporter's word is good for anything except the accuracy and perhaps the cogency of his own reports. But there is plenty of valuable testimony already at hand to cancel the wilder and vaguer surmises about wooden ships, to answer some of the more stupid assertions, and to narrow the controversy to questions mainly of policy and judgment.

When the clash came early in June between General Goethals, representing the conservative disposition toward wooden ship construction, and Messrs. Eustis and Clark, representing the sanguine disposition, there was no talk whatever about the general practicability of building a number of wooden ships. Mr. Eustis, then General Goethals's assistant, announced that the Corporation had formal offers from ten contractors who wanted to build wooden ships or hulls, the total number to be undertaken being 786, 496 of them to be delivered within a year, the balance within six months more. The biggest of these contractors were not shipbuilders, but they were building contractors that had gone into the questions of lumber supply, the seasoning of timber, the availability of labor, and had sufficiently satisfied themselves on these primary points to be "ready to put up a bond to make good their offer to obtain hulls for this Hough design next November." The points at issue between General Goethals and Messrs. Eustis and Clark did not include such elemental matters as the resources of the country in lumber or the available supply of labor. General Goethals was content to assert the insufficiency of funds during the period when he was supposed to have been dilatory; to put forward his case for the lump sum basis of contract as against the "cost plus 10 per cent" sought by the contractors; and to declare his unwillingness, "in view of the recommendation of the naval architect," to take the responsibility of contracting for the construction of ships on the Hough or the Donnelly designs.

But before a layman touches on questions of contract and design, which involve technical judgment, the plain representations as to raw material are worth considering. In the Southern trade journal, The Manufacturers Record, of May 31st, the spokesman of the Southern Pine Association, J. E. Rhodes, gave it as his opinion that "the South is prepared to furnish the lumber required and to build all of the wooden ships that the United States government may demand." "The schedule of the bill for standard wooden ships to be built for the emergency fleet calls for 1,436,000 feet of timber for each boat. Now, assuming that one-half of the timber product of the South could be made into material suitable for the construction of these wooden boats and meet the requirements of the government schedule, it will be seen that the required number of feet for two hundred boats could be manufactured every thirty days, and that this process could be continued indefinitely. . . . The South, with its two hundred or more shipyards, is equal to the situation. It may be stated here that the annual timber output of the United States does not represent the full mill capacity of

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the country, which is capable of producing 117,000,000,000 feet of lumber of all species of timber, although only 40,000,000,000 feet are actually produced. These are government figures, not mine." W. H. Sullivan of the Great Southern Lumber Co., the "greatest lumber mill of America," agrees with Mr. Rhodes as to the quick availability of timber. As to seasoned timber, "We furnish material for a few ships built in this territory," he adds, "and the custom has been to load timbers direct from the saw on cars and sent to shipyard, where it would be framed and kept on sticks 30 to 60 days, until surface dried." "We have been in the shipbuilding and repairing business for 26 years," say Jos. Weaver & Sons of Orange, Texas. "Six weeks is ample time for yellow pine lumber, 90 per cent heart, to season under ordinary weather conditions."

At the banquet of the Iron and Steel Institute late in May General Goethals gave picturesque expression to his doubts as to the availability of timber. "Birds are still nesting in the trees," he said, "from which the great wooden fleet was to be made." So long as the trees exist and the sawmills to cut them, the General's remark seems to be mainly important as a contribution to ornithology. It implies, beyond doubt, that the plans for a great wooden fleet were incredibly backward if the timbers were not already in the yards. But the significance of unpreparedness in this direction depends entirely on the cut that would have to be made, the time it would take to make it, the matter of transportation and of seasoning. And unless the Shipping Board had proceeded in the very way that General Goethals himself declared he had no right to proceed without money, it is difficult to see how the timber could have been more definitely arranged for.

It is all the more difficult, certainly, when one considers General Goethals's insistence on the intricate Ferris design. The question of design, one must hasten to say, is a question of expert judgment and the Ferris is preferred from the academic standpoint by everyone whose verdict appears competent. But there is no debating that the Hough design was made with a view to timbers of the market size, where the Ferris design left this factor out of consideration. And it is relevant to recall that the naval architect on whose recommendation General Goethals sidetracked the Hough design was Mr. Ferris of the Ferris design. General Goethals did not single out Mr. Ferris. He inherited him. But it throws rather a sickly light on the selection of a design for wooden ships that the man whose recommendation was sought as to other designs was the man whose own design stands approved.

The standard for the wooden ship involves a technical decision of enormous significance. How does a special representative of the Department of Labor pass on the relative merits of the designs? The opinion of C. T. Clayton may or may not be competent—I do not know—but it was transmitted to the Shipping Board at the request of Mr. Eustis and presents the following conclusions, quite at variance with General Goethals's:

1. Under like condition of yards, personnel and material supply, after careful comparison of the plans mentioned, I believe that the Hough model can be constructed in from one-third to one-half less time than the Ferris model.

2. Careful analysis of the Hough and Ferris plans convince me that the Hough model is well adapted to the employment of intensive factory methods and that the Ferris model is not so well adapted to such methods.

3. Consideration of the two plans suggested further that the sizes of timber required in the Hough model are such as mills generally are accustomed to producing; therefore, practically all mills may be called upon for supplies of such timber; this may not be said of the construction of the Ferris model. Moreover the timber necessary for the Hough model is of size readily obtained. . . .

4. Further, it seems possible to employ much larger proportion of unskilled labor—in the sense of labor unaccustomed to ship construction—in the very simple Hough than in the conventional Ferris model.

Against these considerations of economy in time, in cost of material, in freedom of choice as to construction yards, and flexibility of labor necessities, lie two objections to the Hough model that I have noticed compared with the Ferris design.

1. The Hough model is simply a Vee-bottomed barge with moulded bow and torpedo model stern. Decidedly it is an unbeautiful boat.

2. The Hough model's stern lines do not impress me. Probably it will require more power and be somewhat inclined to dullness in sailing qualities. However, it has been suggested that some slight alteration in the after lines might improve this.

It is for the Board to determine whether these objections are of sufficient importance to overbalance their possible economy, which may extend more than two months in time and from 25 per cent to 35 per cent in money cost of these hulls.

The form of contract for the building of wooden ships is peculiarly important on account of the inexperience of the contractors in a large number of cases. It is also discussed in a report from Mr. Clayton of the Department of Labor. The lump-sum contract, favored by General Goethals, is regarded as certain to disorganize wage-scales and assure a final general strike and tie-up. As manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation General Goethals has no such fears. He protects the contractor "on account of advances in the cost of labor and in the price of materials. The only contingency unprotected is inexperience, which is not a contingency, if the prospective contractor possesses the necessary and proper organization for carrying on the work."

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Anyone who has seen a green contractor getting ready to envelop an order for a wooden ship, his yard as inchoate as the day before creation, his helpers very likely a stream of transient and temperamental novices, must feel the same impulse as General Goethals to have the country protected against inexperience. Inexperience, however, is a condition that simply cannot be precluded in this emergency any more than in the building of aeroplanes, the making of munitions, the fighting of the war. If inexperience is to be handled suspiciously and repressively, the prospects for wooden ships are remarkably slim. Quite possibly a lump-sum basis of contract is not nearly so likely to ensure the building of ships as an entirely different organization of production, one that is based much less on the notion of guarding the country against grafting contractors than on the notion of eliminating competition for labor and "working the yards, practically, as one, respecting the labor; and indeed in other ways." The cost-plus-percentage plan offers a direct incentive to contractors to boost their costs, however. Supervised cost-plus-fee is an alternative that might work best of all in a field where the lump-sum basis, considered in relation to the desirability of stimulating production, is held by many to be questionable.

General Goethals is known nationally for his genius in carrying out a vast program, handling the problems of material and design and price and payment so that within a given period, his word being law, a colossal task was superbly achieved. This ability is indispensable to the United States in carrying out the ship program, but it is not necessarily identical with the ability to diagnose a new emergency and prescribe the program that is to meet it. The ship emergency is one of many strange emergencies that the war has thrust on the United States, and the man who was called upon to act had to be one who made his reputation in another sphere. But it is totally unfair to that man, even if he is General Goethals, to expect a rounded and full-fledged and impeccable program for ship construction to spring from his administrative head. Such miracles do not happen. Even though General Goethals was assured absolute authority in all matters of construction when he became manager of the Corporation in April, that did not equip him to make a ship program. And the program is undoubtedly still to be made.

"I regard all boards as long, narrow and wooden," said General Goethals at the steel dinner, "and being a believer in authority I wanted both money and authority." Money and authority he has, but the country needs to know why our resources for wooden ships are being so partially utilized. Magnificent as the record of General Goethals has been, it would be unwise to accept his ipse dixit on wooden ships so largely on the basis of his record. It is impossible, of course, to force him to undertake a plan that appears hopeless to him. That is not to be considered. But if the project for a thousand wooden ships appears promising to many men who have a different vision from General Goethals, and who are to all appearances supported by solid fact, then they are entitled to ask for authority, in a crisis where a thousand extra ships may mean all the difference to the world.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

CORRESPONDENCE

Prose Rhythm

SIR: A professor has again opened his mouth and invoked the God of all science in an attempt to solve the perplexing problem of prose rhythm. The God of all science has inflicted his mouth with very difficult and technical terms, and his book with a bias as precise and as unfortunate as the biases in other books on the same subject. Dr. Patterson's failure to solve this problem—his book was reviewed in a late number of your magazine—has again raised the question: Is there any objective rhythm in prose; and if so, what is the nature of its organization?

For twenty years or more, modern students have been answering this question in a variety of ways; and since Dionysius of Halicarnassus first started the squabble there has been no authoritative answer. Yet, if there is objective rhythm in prose, and there certainly seems to be, and if rhythm *is* an organization of sound, and they all agree that it is, there must be some way of getting at a final answer. That answer it seems can only be given by avoiding the mistakes that previous scholars have made.

Two kinds of men have attacked the problem, prosodists and philologists on the one hand, and subtle psychologists on the other. The prosodists failed, first, because they were unable to adapt their method to their material. The texture of prose rhythms is too subtle, it seems, to be discovered by ears that are as sensitive even as those of Clark or Sievers. These men have used their ears only as measuring sticks; and while the results may be satisfactory for a few, the ears of the masses are not calibrated with sufficient accuracy. After the organization of prose rhythms is definitely established, the subjective method of plotting them ought to serve. But the fact of the matter is, that as yet, there has been established only the merest outline of their organization.

The prosodists have failed, in the second place, because they have used to define their meaning antiquated symbols on which has been imposed a foreign and inaccurate connotation. Those nice pictures, those curved and vertical and horizontal lines with their pretty Greek and Latin names, with which Mr. Saintsbury draws interesting cartoons of sentences, serve very well, as Dr. Patterson points out, to delight the eye. They have, as Mr. Saintsbury himself admits, little further significance. At one time they were used to indicate length, or quantity, or time relations. Then they came to be used as indicators of accent and its alternative pitch. The element of precise time, "the drum beat time," seems to have been lost sight of. And finally

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these symbols were grouped, as Mr. Saintsbury grouped them, in any vicarious fashion to make up "feet." What these feet were, what gave them a right to their being, what were the principles of their organization, nobody bothered to decide. Indeed, these feet have been treated like the coin of the king's realm. Their denomination, scholars think, is immediately appreciable. Even if most of us could have agreed with Mr. Saintsbury's or Mr. Clark's placing of the accents, few of us can agree with their divisions into feet or into cursus.

The other sort of man that has amused himself with prose rhythm is your subtle psychologist. He tries to get everything there is to be got in prose, but in getting the everything he forgets the prose itself. After having completely hypostasized his instrument, and after performing the intricate scientific ritual, he finds himself ingulfed in a mass of data that obscures his real object. This data often leads him into the highways and byways of individual variation or general rhythmic experience, and he finds himself constrained to publish, as Mr. E. W. Scripture did, a volume or two of data before he attacks the subject that he is really interested in.

These are, in brief, the mistakes that seem to have been made during the past twenty years in the study of prose rhythm. The prosodist "has no use for the paradings of scientific theory"; the scientist has no use for prose. And yet, to return to the beginning, if rhythm is organization, this organization is demonstrable. How should the demonstration proceed?

It should proceed first, it seems to me, by getting an objective standard of measurement. The ear is evidently too inaccurate. The only method of accurate measurement is by graphing the voice waves of a sufficiently large jury of observers, and by measuring in them, what is to be found of pitch, stress and duration.

What account should be taken of individual variation? Compared to the strictly psychological method, very little attention should be paid to this factor. We should, however, allow for it. If, for instance, a passage of prose were read by twelve different persons, their readings graphed and measured, would not any agreement found in the measurements be sufficiently normal to be used as bases for conclusions?

Finally a sufficiently large and varied number of passages should be used to make the conclusions general. Malory's flat and simple kind of prose should be represented; and also the rhythmical jags of Ruskin; and the free verse should be used, and the so-called formal verse should be worked on. The passages, in fine, should be as representative as possible of the English spoken or written word.

By using the technique of voice measurement developed by E. W. Scripture, and by applying the generally sound ideas on rhythmic experience in general that Dr. Patterson has posited, it should be, I think, no difficult job finally to determine what prose rhythm really is.

Whether the determination of the nature and architecture of prose rhythms is of any real value to men of letters is, of course, another question. It is an interesting problem at any rate; and it could be worked out by anyone who cared to avoid the mistakes of his predecessors, to invest in the necessary apparatus, and to give it the time and the patience that problems of measurement always require. It is a problem, moreover, that is ripe for solution. The many worthy scholars who have given it their attention have developed a technique.

R. D. JAMESON.

Madison, Wisconsin.

Speaking for Slavs

SIR: Mr. Brailsford's statement in his article on The Russian Peace Formula about the enlightened policy of the Austrian Emperor, Carl, would be laughable were it not for the fact that the lack of information concerning Austria displayed by those who are infatuated with the obsolete formula of the possibility of a federated Austrian Empire is such a sad spectacle.

As I received your publication I also received reports showing that Dr. Karel Kramar, the Bohemian leader, is imprisoned in Moellersdorf at hard labor, and that owing to heart trouble his life is in serious danger; that Czech members of the Austrian Parliament, Messrs. Choc and Klofač, are imprisoned and suffer from insufficient nourishment; that five members of the board of directors of the largest Bohemian bank, Zivnostenské Banka, have been imprisoned, charged with high treason, because they did not support the Austrian war loan as the Austrian authorities thought should be done. All these things had happened, and are occurring, under the régime of Mr. Brailsford's enlightened Emperor. All these men are charged with actions which in England or America would hardly provoke a protest, and which, in any event, at the time of their commission were not illegal. But then Mr. Brailsford is intent upon substantiating his formula of the possibility of a federal Austria, and that is perhaps the reason that it makes it possible for him to speak of an enlightened Hapsburg.

CHARLES PERGLER.

Slav Press Bureau, New York City.

American Socialists vs. Germany

SIR: That the American Socialist party in its St. Louis manifesto should have assumed such an attitude of denunciation toward the aims and motives of America in the war, is deeply to be regretted by all those sympathizers with the socialist movement who have wished that its adherents should have no internal disturbance, no division, in working for that plan of social life which they have chosen as their ideal. Yet now that that unfortunate statement has been made, and men like Spargo and Russell have declared their apostasy from the party; it is impossible not to recognize the instruments of dissolution threatening the very roots of the organization. It behooves us to ask what turn of the war would be best for the advancement of Socialism.

What I may call the standpatter Socialist sees in Germany a far more efficient application of the idea of state ownership of public facilities than in any other modern state, but he fails to see that only a people with the German's docility and reverence for divine-right nonsense would allow its political forms to be dictated to it by a caste of insolent noblemen. The Junkers placate the proletarian by giving him some of the advantages of a socialistic polity; but they do so only the easier to make him a slave. So they would save Christ from Golgotha to serve their own ends.

Do the gentlemen who issued the St. Louis resolutions believe the cause of internationalism would be furthered by a German victory? Having lived in Germany for nearly three years up to the outbreak of the war, I speak with personal conviction when I say no nation in modern times has been so saturated with the "Chosen People" idea as Germany has. With what contempt does the better class German look down upon *der Ausländer*—the foreigner!

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As the Kaiser considers himself a "direct instrument in the hand of God," so is the German nation the particular care of God. If this national egotism be the cause of the patronizing attempt to foist Prussian "Kultur" upon an unwilling world, what matters it that its methods of production and distribution are more advanced than ours? A lasting socialism cannot be the tool of ambitious autocrats; it must be absolutely unselfish, it must be based upon the intelligence of the sovereign people.

It is easy to understand the distrust with which liberal-minded men viewed the aims of the Entente Allies prior to the Russian revolution and American belligerency; but since these two events, who can doubt that the world would be the better for the defeat of Prussian egotism, for the freeing of Belgium and Poland? And these are the ends which America will support in the war. There may have been sinister influences among those that brought her in, but they are lost in the noble idealism the war has brought to us. If her motives were "as scarlet, they are now as white as snow."

The party Socialist, in his desire for a "peace without victory," fails to see things in proper perspective. Let him reflect that we are not fighting German socialism, or German efficiency, or German culture. We are fighting the ideas of racial supremacy, of national arrogance, of domination by force. And unless we defeat these it will be a peace with *victory*—for junkerism.

LOUIS B. FENSTER.

San Francisco, California.

India Not Represented

SIR: The article of Mr. Alfred A. Zimmern on British Imperial Reconstruction, published in your issue of June 30th, contains a few inaccuracies concerning India, which need correction.

(1.) It is not correct that "four representatives of India were invited to take part" in the meetings of the War Cabinet. In the War Cabinet, as distinguished from the Imperial Conference, India was represented only by the Secretary of State. The distinction was pointed out by Mr. Lovat Fraezer in a letter to the press.

(2.) The expression "three representatives from the country" is likely to mislead your readers unless it is explained that the three gentlemen mentioned were the nominees of the government of India which she elected or appointed by the people of India. They did not represent India as the country had no voice in their nomination. They represented the British government of India, which in its turn represents the Secretary of State for India.

(3.) The state of Bikanir is by no means "one of the most progressive native states" of India. It cannot stand any comparison with Baroda, or Mysore or Travancore.

(4.) Sir James Meston is not an official of liberal sympathies. A perusal of the native press of the province, over which Sir James rules, will easily prove that.

(5.) Sir S. P. Sinha is not a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. He is at present a member of the Bengal Governor's Executive Council, which is a body distinct from the former. This, however, is a very minor matter and does not affect in any way the merits of Mr. Zimmern's article.

The "illogicality" of "British constitutional practice," spoken of by Mr. Zimmern in the latter part of his article, can be easily explained by the desire of the British statesmen to satisfy the awakened political consciousness of the people of India, by making shadowy sentimental concessions, so long as these latter do not involve the parting of even an iota of real political power. What the people of India demand is the latter. They will not be satisfied with the former. A seat in the War Cabinet, for an Indian, nominated by the British government, is of no consequence to them. It only secures the British government (Imperial) an additional vote as against the self-governing Dominions. To poor, starving India it is of more consequence that she should get fiscal autonomy than a sentimental participation in the Imperial Conference. A sum of 500,000,000 dollars, recently taken from India as a "gift" for war purposes is of greater value to her than all the glory which she gets by so-called participation in the deliberations of the Imperial Cabinet. The former represents an economic loss, colossal in its effects on the health, the wealth and the education of the people of India, which can in no way be made up by the halo of false glory.

LAJPAT RAI.

New York City.

Quoting the Original

SIR: May I voice what intends to be a mild protest at Mr. Paul Rosenfeld's review of my Poems of Heinrich Heine, and insist that my grievance is something more than a matter of personal taste. I do not complain of the fact that Mr. Rosenfeld devoted most of his energies to hunting for the flaws that I warned the reader were there. But I do complain that my reviewer's meticulousness has put him at a disadvantage as it has put me in a false light.

For one thing, as a lover and student of both English and German verse, I must confess that I see nothing "vulgar" or "slovenly" in such a couplet as:

> With a small light in her fingers
> And a great glow in her breast . . .

And I fail to see the reason for Mr. Rosenfeld's censure of my version of Auf Flügeln des Gesanges. Particularly when he writes, "it is inexplicable why he [the present complainant] should have failed to see the huge poetic import of the world he neglected." Whereupon he quotes:

> Dort bei der *dunklen* Ganges

stressing the italicized "dunklen."

My objection to this is loud and two-fold. First, that the word itself would have but the smallest "poetic import" in this context; and, second, that the "neglected" word is not even there. The line, in Heine's rather than Mr. Rosenfeld's German, runs:

> Fort nach den Fluren des Ganges.

It is somewhat hard, in a review of over three hundred translations, to have the emphasis placed on a few of the self-acknowledged failures. But it is harder to be blamed for the failure to translate something that was never even in the original.

LOUIS UNTERMEYER.

New York City.

[REVIEWER'S NOTE: Mr. Untermeyer is right. The line does run

> Fort nach den Fluren des Ganges.

Certainly it was a good deal of a bull to misquote it in such circumstances.]

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At the Capitol

THE most important innovation in the war revenue bill which, after six weeks of deliberation, the Finance Committee has now placed before the Senate, is the new methods which are provided for the levying of an excess profits tax. For a flat rate, based upon the far from normal profits of the one year preceding the entrance of this country into the war, the Committee has substituted a sliding scale, ranging from twelve to fifty per cent, upon profits estimated on the three-year average of 1911, 1912, and 1913. The revision is not only fairer in policy, but by yielding $300,000,000 more than would have been derived from the House plan has permitted the abandonment of certain shortsighted provisions, such as the undiscriminating tariff increases. The thorough revision made by the Senate Committee, however, is by no means limited to the excess profits section of the bill. The Committee has cut in half the levy upon passenger transportation, added an entirely new consumption tax of eighty-six million dollars upon tea, sugar, coffee and cocoa, and struck out completely the provisions for increased letter postage and for a retroactive tax on 1916 incomes. The one item in the entire bill which the Committee did not radically alter was a tax upon freight transportation.

This thorough overhauling, however, was by no means a surprise to the House. Mr. Austin more or less accurately reflected the attitude of the members of that body when he remarked, the day on which the bill was passed: "Nobody is really at heart for this bill, and yet a great majority are going to vote for it, and vote for it believing the body at the other end of the Capitol is going radically to change, amend and modify it, so that when it comes back here it will be a safe and sane measure we can finally vote for." Ideas as to what would constitute a safe and sane measure had a wide divergence; but the House was conscious that it was drafting an outline rather than an act, that it was in fact delegating to the Senate the major share in initiating a revenue measure—an authority expressly denied it in the terms of the Constitution.

The inability of the House to preserve intact its power as sole originator of financial legislation is not, to be sure, a product of the war. It is an inability which has been in existence for some time, but which has for the most part been screened by parliamentary procedure. Where the House has not initiated a financial measure it has at least derived a modest satisfaction in giving to it a mock legality. Thus, for instance, when the Senate added to the Naval Appropriation act of March 4, 1917, a bond issue provision for $150,000,000, the House raised immediate objection to the irregularity of the procedure. The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. Fitzgerald, declared: "Mr. Speaker, the one great prerogative of the House of Representatives is the right to originate revenue bills, and however lowly this House has ever descended, it has never yet yielded a single iota of that privilege. [Applause.] . . . The Senate has sent this bill here in defiance of the warning given, and in derogation of the rights of the House. There is nothing for us to do except to insist upon our Constitutional prerogative and to follow the unbroken precedents of the republic by sending this bill to the Senate, so that they may eliminate the provision which infringes upon our principles." As a result of this plea for a show of assertiveness the House returned the bill, with a resolution informing the Senate that its amendment contravened the seventh section of the Constitution. The Senate, accordingly, was compelled to withdraw the section; but since the House obligingly initiated and immediately passed a resolution identical with the Senate's amendment, its action was the empty gesture of a body not ready publicly to admit the lapsing of its chief source of prestige.

Since the beginning of the war, however, due to the need of haste and the general bewilderment of a body which has so long been forced by its constituents to think in terms of districts that it cannot readily adjust itself to national issues, it has not been possible to conceal so successfully the uncertain hold which the House has on its technical authority to originate financial legislation. War was declared on the evening of April 5th, and the following morning the Senate indicated that it was to take the lead in matters of war finance. Into the General Deficiencies bill, which was then before it, the Senate wrote a lump-sum appropriation of $100,000,000, without a roll-call vote, and with no restriction upon its expenditures save the broad declaration that under the direction of the President it be utilized "for the national security and defense, and for each and every purpose connected therewith." In size and in character this was a bold challenge to the theoretical authority of the House—a challenge which the House refused to accept, comforted by the somewhat dubious assurance of the Appropriations Committee that in overlooking this early irregularity, it would make less likely the occurrence of similar irregularities in the future.

Since then, however, successive financial measures have offered less reasonable pretexts for a surrender on the part of the House, while emphasizing the increasing authority of origination which the Senate has taken for its own. To the Urgent Deficiencies bill, the principal measure appropriating funds for war needs, the Senate added $514,000,000—a sum approximately a third as large as the entire federal budget for the fiscal year preceding the war. This amendment included an appropriation for the merchant ships to be built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation—a great program in financial legislation openly initiated in the upper house. The Senate also originated the bill extending the life of the war-risk insurance bureau, passed a measure, not yet approved by the House, providing for government purchase of farm fertilizers, and added to the Urgent Deficiencies bill a three million-dollar appropriation for the purchase of a naval base at Jamestown. With the revision now made in the revenue bill, there is not an important piece of financial war legislation which has not to a great degree been initiated in the Senate.

This development, given such impetus in the three first months of the war, has not been disadvantageous in the matter of securing funds for an American offensive; but it has revealed unmistakably that present practices completely disappoint the expectation of checks and balances which the designers of the Constitution had in mind. In The Federalist, No. 58, Madison declared: "The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of the government. They, in a word, hold the purse." Such a theory is no longer tenable. The House of Representatives does not hold the purse; it has fallen between the House, the Senate, and the administrative leaders whose influence is wielded from the outside—until it is no longer held by anyone. At best the lodging in the House of powers to initiate financial measures is an only partly responsible device, less accurate and less adjustable than a budget system. Opponents of such a system have heretofore demanded further proof of the need of resorting to an innovation, and that proof the war is rapidly furnishing them.

C. M.

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Books and Things

WHEN Carlyle was reviewing Croker's Boswell he gave all reviewers this tip: "At most, perhaps, we are bound to inform simple readers, with all possible brevity, what manner of performance and Edition this is; especially, whether, in our poor judgment, it is worth laying out three pounds sterling upon, yea or not." Apply this test to Comedies of Words and Other Plays, by Arthur Schnitzler, Englished from the German by Pierre Loving (Cincinnati: Stewart & Kidd Company). Is this book worth a dollar and a half? Yes, in spite of Mr. Loving's translation, which is never very good, mediocre most of the time, now and then very bad. At his worst Mr. Loving is capable of turning Schnitzler into English like these specimens: "Her nibs"—"daughterkin"—"a sentimental jag"—"the doctor has traveled considerable"—"if I err not"—"I expect him back ere long"—"to-day yet"—"I know my fiancée but two years"—"quite an amusing cut-up"—"so far as wags who are niggardly endowed go." This list includes nearly all Mr. Loving's major enormities. Once in a long while he misunderstands the German. At the end of Literature, when Margaret's novel is about to be published, Clement sees the publisher and arranges to have the book suppressed. Mr. Loving makes Clement say: "We are going to put it out for sale." Which makes nonsense of the dénouement. The introduction, however, does show that Mr. Loving has a genuine love of Schnitzler, is thoroughly aware of his importance in contemporary literature, gives to The Green Cockatoo the place it deserves as one of the most absolutely "done" of all short plays: "For sheer subtlety and evasive deftness of handling, for artistry or artifice as well as art—the art, I mean, which perfectly coalesces theme and framework, The Green Cockatoo is in its way unsurpassable in the history of drama." He tells us that Schnitzler still lives in Vienna, still maintains "his intimate connection with the Clinical Hospital, and still, as if they constituted a labor of first love, unremittingly attends to his private activities as a general practitioner." How does such a busy physician find time to write? Mr. Loving raises but does not answer this question.

Another reason for buying this English version is that the original Komödie der Worte (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1915) cannot now be had in this country, except by a lucky accident. The only copy I've been able to lay my hands on is in the reference department of the New York Public Library. It contains three one-act plays—Stunde des Erkennens, Grosse Szene and Das Bacchusfest. To these three, called in the English translation The Hour of Recognition, The Big Scene and the Festival of Bacchus, Mr. Loving has added two other of Schnitzler's one-act plays—Literature, from Lebendige Stunden, and His Helpmate, from the volume named after The Green Cockatoo. Of the three new plays, he says that they "represent the most recent product from Schnitzler's pen, and though, as we think, they will scarcely enhance his reputation to any great extent, they do, nevertheless, contine in the tradition of his best work." This is true, I suppose, although I am never quite certain, when I have said that something will not enhance its author's reputation, that I know the exact meaning of the words. What state of mind, existing in the reader at the moment of reading, do they express? Even after I had finished the three new plays these words did not find their own way into my mind. What I felt, among other things, was wonder.

How does Schnitzler, who has written many one-act plays, manage never to write a failure? What makes each of them so new? Surprisingly new, when we remember that nearly all of them have the same subject. Santayana says of love, in The Light of Reason: "Poets and novelists never tire of depicting it anew; but although the experience they tell of is fresh and unparalleled in every individual, their rendering suffers, on the whole, from a great monotony. Love's gestures and symbols are noted and unvarying; its vocabulary is poor and worn." How do the men and women in Schnitzler's one-act plays, men and women nearly all of whom we see in a crisis brought about by love, escape the great monotony? During the half-hour that we spent in their company they exist chiefly as points in a relation, in that wife-husband-lover or husband-wife-mistress relation with which so many dramatists and novelists have made us wearily familiar. And these men and women, taken together, do not suggest to us an abundant and varied life. With but few exceptions they could be reduced to a few types. Why does their experience seem so fresh and unparalleled in almost every individual? Partly because it seems fresh and unparalleled to these experiencers themselves. Emma Bovary found in adultery the same monotony she had found in marriage. That is just what nobody in Schnitzler ever finds—an essential monotonous likeness in one love to another. Ten years before that Hour of Recognition in which we meet Klara Eckold she was estranged from Karl, her husband, a man difficult to live with. Two men loved her then—Ormin, a doctor like her husband, but brilliant and far more successful; and Floding, an obscure and unhappy journalist and poet. Klara loved them both, and became the mistress of the one she loved less, choosing him because the little that was all she could give meant so much more to him than a greater gift could have meant to Ormin, a man of many women. Both by the little she gave Floding and by her unwillingness to give Ormin the more he would have wanted, she measures her affection for her husband, their friendship, the worth of that life together which a passion for Ormin, had she yielded to it, would have destroyed. Each of these loves is fresh in Klara's memory, unique in her consciousness. She values and appraises each.

Suddenly comes a revolution in Klara Eckold's judgment of these values. Her daughter, married the day before, has left Vienna to live in Berlin. Ormin is going a journey so dangerous that he is likely never to come back. Neither she nor her husband has seen Floding for years. Eckold has been waiting for this day. His daughter has gone. He tells his wife they must separate, tells her he knows she had a lover ten years ago, has known it ten years. Klara, whose love for Floding was an episode, who has felt a sincere affection for Eckold after their reconciliation at the close of that episode, sees that for him there was no reconciliation. What she showed her husband she felt: but his conduct has been a lie. He has cheated and degraded her. When she realizes this, realizes too that her husband is mistaken on one point, that he thinks her lover was Ormin, she bursts into a modern song of triumph, declares that she was Ormin's mistress, exults in that happiness. She sees her husband as he is, Ormin as all that he might have been to her, Floding is forgotten. To appreciate the freshness of Klara's experience one must read the play, meet the disclosures in the subtle order that Schnitzler has given to them, feel at first hand the life-like play of obscurer motives in and out among the clear motives.

P. L.

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German Annexations and Indemnities

Das annexionistische Deutschland, by S. Grumbach. Lausanne: Payot & Co.

IT is now the fashion in certain quarters to speak of the Russian formula of "peace without annexations and indemnities" as a pro-German device. Perhaps no other phrase is so often characterized by that ready epithet. To protest against it is to invite more contempt. To cite by way of defense a few passages from German papers and magazines which have filtered through the British dragnet is to convince our modern Cotton Mathers that deep damnation ought to be dealt out immediately. Anyone can tell by "natural reason," especially if he is an enemy of the modern school and well trained in the classics, that German spies have bought up Russian traitors with depreciated marks and induced them to do the Kaiser's peace fanfare.

At last, however, the worm may turn. Herr Grumbach, with Teutonic thoroughness, has brought together a stout volume of papers and documents which prove that the dominant figures in Germany (with few exceptions) consider peace without annexations and indemnities in no other light than that of a humiliating defeat. Here are hundreds of extracts from German speeches, official declarations, party resolutions, editorials, pamphlets, magazine and newspaper articles (in the original tongue with authorities cited), all showing that in almost every circle, high and low, throughout the German Empire the Russian formula has been a hated phrase. The persons quoted include the Emperor and the King of Bavaria, ministers of state, high imperial officers, important men of affairs, generals in the army (active and retired), professors, members of the Reichstag, members of the Prussian Landtag, socialists, publicists, and pamphleteers. All upper-class parties and all interests are fully represented; the Conservatives, the Center, the National Liberals, the Progressive People's party, and the minor factions are all on record. As if with one voice they proclaim to the world that for Germany the territorial status quo ante is impossible, unthinkable. Against this doctrine can be marshalled only a few protests from Social Democrats and scattered individuals.

The Kaiser calls for peace that will offer to Germany "free seas" and "necessary military, political, and economic securities." The King of Bavaria declares that "a strengthening of the German Empire and an expansion beyond its present boundaries, so far as this is necessary to guarantee security against future attacks—such is to be the fruit of this war." The Duke of Mecklenburg demands a peace that will give the empire a mighty colonial dominion in Africa and a sufficient number of strongholds scattered throughout the world for coaling stations, wireless towers, and trading posts. Bethmann-Hollweg calmly informs us that the conditions before the war cannot be restored and that peace can only come when Germany is established in an impregnable position. He further adds that if anyone thinks that Germany will surrender the conquered territories of the west without guaranties that Belgium will not again become a vassal state of England and France, he is sadly mistaken. "This means," he continues significantly, "no status quo ante—Germany cannot again abandon the long oppressed Flemish people to alien dominion" (*Verwelschung*). The Secretary of State for the Colonies announces that Germany has no intention of surrendering her oversea dominions, but will, on the contrary, seek to strengthen and develop her colonial possessions.

The former Chancellor, Fürst Bülow, frankly holds that the simple restoration of the condition before the war would be not a gain but a loss (*nicht Gewinn, sondern Verlust*)—not victory, but defeat. Therefore he demands annexations east and west. "The French simply cannot understand the fact that what they regard as the brutal harshness of a conqueror is merely national necessity for us Germans. Perhaps the French will in the course of time acquiesce in the provisions of the Frankfort peace [1871] if it is at last realized that they are unchangeable, and especially if we succeed in developing our still unfavorable strategic position over against France." The poor French, they cannot understand that German brutality is at bottom necessitarian generosity!

While von Bülow casts his eyes upon Poland and then upon Belfort, Director Ballin is thinking of "das nasse Dreieck," and he tells his countrymen that imperious necessity calls for a more secure naval base on the North Sea. (*Deshalb müssen wir hinaus noch über das Gebiet der Nordsee hinweg uns einen Flottenstützpunkt suchen.*) Moreover, the Germans must have strong naval bases overseas. Von Tirpitz is more ambitious. Germany must have "a world-spanning horizon." Ludendorf will beat great Russia back east and keep her there. Professor Dr. Albert Hillebrandt, member of the Prussian House of Lords, proposes to keep the flags where they are, "over the graves of our heroes"—*in Ost und West muss die deutsche Flagge über den Gräbern unsern Helden wehen.* Von Bissing suggests to the Kaiser on his birthday that they should keep that which had been entrusted to them (*Das, was uns anvertraut ist, das wollen wir festhalten*). It is not recorded that the Kaiser rebuked him for entertaining un-German views.

"Comrade" Peus strikes hands with von Bissing and von Bülow, the new philosopher of the categorical imperative. He fears that Germany may again be attacked from the east and west, and solves the problem by adding Belgium to her economic hinterland—Deutschland. Nothing could be simpler, and "Comrade" Peus imagines a Belgian deputy, weary of seeing his country a sacrifice to France and England, seeking freedom and peace in the arms of Germany! "Comrade" Südekum (who, by the way, a few years ago, in a conversation with the present reviewer, roundly damned the Kaiser and his American "sycophants" as the enemies of peace and liberty) is now for "necessary territorial securities." "Comrade" Heilmann explains that "a defensive war does not become a war of conquest if one is the victor in the end and wins something (*etwas gewinnt*). The pacific proletarians of the German *Transportarbeiterverband,* though they still have their chains, proudly announce that "The German flag waves over Antwerp, let us hope forever."

Monists join the "comrades." According to Ernst Haeckel's program: (a) Belgium is to be divided, the greatest portion to go to Germany direct, a second part to Luxemburg (which is to become a German state), and a third part [astounding generosity] to fall to Holland; (b) Germany to seize most of the British colonies and the Belgian Congo; (c) the northeastern provinces of France are to go to Germany; (d) the kingdom of Poland to be restored and united with Austria-Hungary; (e) the Baltic provinces to be "restored" to Germany. Such was the

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reasoned answer which the learned doctor gave to the inquiring president of the Berlin Monist Association.

But it may be said that speeches of dignitaries and articles of frenzied Monists do not represent the silent will of an entire Christian nation. Perhaps not, but the editor of this collection of documents anticipates this objection. He includes the resolutions of political parties and associations of all kinds. First in this group of documents is the "Declaration of all the bourgeois parties in the Reichstag." When, in December, 1915, the Social Democrat, Scheidemann, denounced annexationist policies, the leader of the Center, Spahn, in the name of the bourgeoisie, replied that the coming peace must guarantee the military, economic, financial, and political interests of Germany and include the necessary territorial acquisitions. His announcement was greeted by repeated cheers. The parties in whose name and with whose approval Spahn made this declaration polled, in the election of 1912, eight million votes. If still unconvinced, the reader may turn to the resolutions adopted by the several parties independently, all of which follow the general profession of faith for the middle classes. The National Liberals demand in the west a strengthening of the empire on sea and land and in the east more strategic boundaries and new lands for settlement. The Center and the various brands of Conservatives are equally positive in their territorial ambitions. Only the Social Democratic party refuses officially to join the chorus.

Then there are the professors. Frederick the Great was right when he said that there was always some pedant ready to justify anything he did. William II is as fortunately situated. Here in Grumbach's collection are Professor Ludwig Stein, Professor A. Doren, Professor Adolf Wagner, Professor Hermann Schumacher (formerly Kaiser Wilhelm professor at Columbia University), Professor Hans Delbrück, and more besides. They are here individually and collectively. On pp. 132-140 is printed the famous petition of the professors to the Imperial Chancellor in which they demand, among other things, annexations along the west front from Belfort to the sea, the retention of Belgium, enormous additions on the Russian front, new colonial dominions, and indemnities. They modestly say: "As to the war indemnity, we naturally wish as much as possible one which will meet the public cost of the war (*die staatlichen Kosten*), provide for the reconstruction of East-Prussia and Alsace, guarantee a pension fund for the invalids and the dependents, reimburse individuals for damages which they have illegally suffered, and cover the expenditures for the restoration and development of our armament." To this modest profession of faith were attached the names of 352 professors, 158 schoolmen and clergymen, 143 civil officers, 148 judges and attorneys, 40 members of the imperial and local legislatures, 18 retired admirals and generals, 182 men from industries, trade, and banking, 52 landlords, and 252 artists, writers, and publishers.

Of these annexationist books, pamphlets, and tracts there seems to be a perfect flood—by professors, factory owners, publicists, editors, and Grub Street professionals. And according to the editor of this collection of extracts, such imperialist manifestos sell in large quantities. "I could enumerate for you," says Herr Grumbach, "dozens and dozens of annexationist and superannexationist books and pamphlets which have appeared in Germany since the outbreak of the war—you would find the best known names among the authors. And they are sold not by the hundreds, but by the thousands and tens of thousands. '200,000 copies sold' stands proudly on the war pamphlet by Houston Stewart Chamberlain, in which the domination of Germany is hysterically celebrated. 'In three weeks 20,000 copies' appears on the cover of a book of 200 pages, bearing the title The Destruction of English World Dominion and Russian Czarism, in the preparation of which Herr von Bleeke has secured the collaboration of a long list of the best known publicists of Germany, who, altogether, quite properly, find in all corners of the earth territories which are worth annexing. 'Sixteenth edition' you may read on the title page of a pamphlet advancing annexationist demands which pass belief, written by Dr. Albert Ritter." When we think of this deluge of brochures and the constant reiterations of the imperialist press we cannot avoid the conclusion that the whole empire is permeated with the gospel of annexation. The ruling classes, quite naturally, taking advantage of the state of mind created by the war, have been "educating" the masses with a vengeance.

The lessons of this amazing volume are many. To say that the Russians, in declaring their unwillingness to spill more blood for the sake of righting historic wrongs and in announcing their readiness for peace without annexations or indemnities, are tools of the Kaiser, paid pro-German propagandists, advance agents of Germanism, is utter folly. Every day's wireless news only confirms the message of this book: "The restoration of the status quo ante without indemnities is not a German victory, but a German defeat." The Allies may view such an outcome as they like. There is no doubt about the German view. There is another lesson of equal importance. The intellectual leaders of the German Empire, with few exceptions, are bent upon a consolidation of military and economic dominion such as the world has never seen. The loose-jointed, ramshackle British empire is but a child's house of cards in comparison. All classes of Germany, excepting a few recalcitrants, are won over to the gospel of Machtpolitik. The Social Democrats were long ago promised their pound of flesh. The capitalists are not to have it all their own way. Out of the rivalry of junkers and capitalists, the Social Democrats will win a larger share of the national wealth than the working classes of any other country enjoy. The junkers are willing to give the proletariat no inconsiderable portion of the capitalists' incomes. The capitalists are to have indemnities and trade. The socialists will secure more for the masses by playing the junker against the capitalist than by throwing overboard the junker. Here is a national combination which will test the strength of all the Allies.

There is one hope. The work of "educating" the German masses has been facilitated by the great fear. Throughout Herr Grumbach's collection there runs this note: "The Allies, especially England, are bent on our economic destruction because of their jealousy. If we do not strengthen ourselves by annexations and indemnities, we are lost as a nation." Here is the task of diplomacy and politics in the allied nations: "What terms of peace can we offer to the German nation that will belie the claims of the imperialists and snap the cords that bind the classes and the masses?" Chicanery will avail naught. Vague generality and suspicion-breeding ambiguity will avail naught. There must be generosity and reality in our proposals. It must be no trick clumsily designed to deceive the German masses, but a confession of justice and a program that squares with German rights in the earth. It may be that we must rend the veil before we can see the light. But it shines nevertheless.

CHARLES A. BEARD.

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Loading the Dice

Summer, a novel, by Edith Wharton. New York: D. Appleton & Co. $1.50.

NO novelist so accomplished as Mrs. Wharton could fail to write a personable story, but there is an air of falsity about this new invention of hers that arouses a good deal of interest. The idiom, so far as an outsider may guess, is quite true to New England. At the proper moment the girl, Charity says, "I want you should leave me," and one hears a human voice. The background is intimately observed, so that one keenly sees the structure of New England houses of many types, and is constantly aware of the dominant Mountain from whose lawlessness Charity was redeemed into North Dormer, to look forward to that sexual limbo which rewards New England virtue. The sweet airs of New England summer fields and woods give a crispness and charm to those pages over which Mrs. Wharton lingers most affectionately, and the contrast of a hot holiday throng in a fair-sized neighboring town is prosecuted with all of her lynx-like sharpness. It is certainly not in these respects that the story can be said to be false.

The theme to which Mrs. Wharton gives such circumstantialities is no more alien to her, so far as intelligent comprehension goes, than the idiom and the background themselves. It is one of those stories of the inexorable that seem perfectly to lend themselves to Mrs. Wharton's icy restraint. If you want to get a region in which inexorability of the moral order has a whacking good time, you do not have to go to New England. George Eliot, as I seem to remember from terrified perusal at the age of fourteen, made the mills of the gods grind with the usual insufficiency of car-grease in the Italy of Romola and Tito. When it came to the inexorable in the classics, Greece was its favorite locale. Before that time the land of Job was its eminent home—and, if one is going to be open-handed in this respect, what's the matter with Wessex as the scene of cursèd spite? But while New England has no exclusive proprietorship in the grim-inexorable, there is no doubt that the specific gravity of human conduct is deemed higher in that estimable region than in any other region habitable by the serious story-teller. Mrs. Katherine Fullerton Gerould goes one better than Mrs. Wharton when she wants inexorability. She also resorts to New Englanders but she transplants them to Mocha or Java or Guatemala and serves them up with a little Golden Bough-wow. This mixture of strange and familiar gods jags one's nerves in a delightful manner, but there is a certain incontrovertible safety and sanity about harsh moral laws as they operate in New England, and Mrs. Wharton's instinct is perfectly sound when she proceeds to exhibit the inexorable doing business at the same old stand.

The trouble with Summer, however, is that Mrs. Wharton rather forces her note. It is not that seduction as a scheme for literary *bouleversement* is a little out of date. There is no such thing as a catastrophe too trite to be worth reciting. It is only that Mrs. Wharton, always inclined to be sub-human, is much too callous in the uses to which she has put this seduction. She has seen with that frigid eye of hers what an excellent chance there would be, against the background of an outlaw Mountain, to show a child adopted into the prim village violating the code of the village, being utterly incapable of enduring the squalor of the outlawry from which she sprang, and being ruthlessly mangled between the stark cliff that rejects her and the waves that fling her blindly against it. This scene of the pitiless, the inevitable, the inexorable, has special attractions for Mrs. Wharton's peculiar temperament. It is not that she is so full of pity, like Thomas Hardy, that she cannot remove her eyes from the spectacle of hapless shipwreck. It is not that she is so full of lifebuoy morality, like George Eliot, that she cannot help taking a coastguard interest in these perilous situations. It is more that she cannot help realizing the grisly effectiveness of seeing a fair skiff riding in on the waves of those forces that dominate life, and wrecked for one's fascinated eyes. The wreck may be merely to a dream, the insubstantial fabric of a vision, but the authenticity of that wreck, the bedevilment of the vision, give a wintry glow to the specialist in frustration that occupies a part of Mrs. Wharton's soul.

A good shipwreck, moral or physical, is by no means the least satisfactory of fictional themes, but no author has a right to run up and down the shore line waving a harmless heroine to destruction. What one dislikes in Summer is the undoubted purpose of the author to dish the heroine for the sake of the sensation of dishing her. One really suffers on account of the pace at which Mrs. Wharton hurries over the poignancy of a human record to arrive at a cruel predicament. The feeling is certainly established before the end that as a human being Charity Royall is nothing to her author, is merely a creature to be substantiated in detail in order that a dramatic sensation can be properly pulled off, and the curtain rung down before a breathless audience. The scene itself is not just an ingredient in Mrs. Wharton's contrivance, and the youth, Lucius Harney, is not dislocated for the purposes of the story. But the primitive mountaineers, Charity's guardian lawyer, Royall, who wants to marry her, the fierce pride of Charity, the vague "other girl" in the offing to whom the seducer is engaged, are all factors in an arrangement, a scheme, which has none of that generous human preoccupation about it which is needed to win the credence of the reader. Mrs. Wharton wants the credence of the reader, but she proposes to earn it by authoritative manner, not by any simple method of humane contagion. The result is a falsity that is scarcely accountable in an artist so acute.

Where this is most evident is in the perfunctory treatment of those situations in the life of Charity Royall that most ask one to put oneself in her place. There is, for example, the occasion on which this girl, in love with the young architect who has come for the summer to North Dormer, overhears her guardian disclose to him the secret she has never guessed of her disgraceful parentage. "'My God, how ghastly,' Harney murmured; and Charity, choking with humiliation, sprang to her feet and ran upstairs. She knew at last: knew that she was the child of a drunken convict and of a woman who wasn't 'half-human,' and was glad to have her go; and she had heard this history of her origin related to the one being in whose eyes she longed to appear superior to the people about her! . . . It was too bitter to picture him as the detached impartial listener to such a story. 'I wish he'd go away: I wish he'd go to-morrow, and never come back!' she moaned to her pillow; and far into the night she lay there, in the disordered dress she had forgotten to take off, her whole soul a tossing misery on which her hopes and dreams spun about like drowning straws." This is a curiously superficial and mechanical account of a heroine's crisis. Girls do moan to their pillows, of course, and lie disordered far into the night. But assassination of a hope would create a more bitter fever than this. Imagine Mr. Howells,

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restrained as he really is, offering these few hackneyed and jejune phrases as part of a spiritual history. The fact is, Mrs. Wharton needed Charity Royall's unfortunate ancestry in her business as a story-teller, but the effect of disclosing what in reality was nothing more than a literary *convenance,* she could not take too seriously.

Because of this and other failures in sympathy and plausibility, Summer cannot be set to the right side of Mrs. Wharton's account. The predicament of the girl who loves more than she is loved is intensely valid, the social situation of a girl whose child is to be born out of marriage is the most crucial and difficult in the world. But Mrs. Wharton has arranged for Charity's misfortune too deliberately, deprived her of aid too sweepingly, afforded her marriage with her guardian too simply, to be known as an artist in handling this great theme. It is true that Mrs. Wharton has made the shadows of the Mountain funeral quite terrible, and has brought lawyer Royall to the fore as a welcome relief to an unremitting strain. This kind of skill, however, is the only real gift that Summer illustrates. It is not a repellent story, but is essentially an empty one, and suggests too often the failings of a person who is capable of going slumming among souls.

F. H.

Flying to Victory

Textbook of Naval Aeronautics, by Henry Woodhouse. Introduction by Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. New York: The Century Co. $6.00.

IT is an old bit of wisdom that while America invents other nations develop. Whatever truth is in the generalization is certainly illustrated by the aeroplane. No military man pretends to-day that it took England less than a full year and a half to develop an aeroplane the equal of some of the best French models, and no secret is made of the fact that many of our volunteers in the French Flying Corps—before our own entrance into the war—refused to practise in American machines, let alone engage in battle in them. In spite of the more or less thankless efforts of such organizations as the Aero Club of America, in spite of the enthusiasm of those who saw in the aeroplane a weapon which could lessen the need for the old-fashioned Bismarckian infantry preparedness, our exploitation of the possibilities of the aeroplane lagged. To be sure, we have not had the immediate pressure for development which came to every belligerent European country. Yet the inadequacy of our aeroplane service in the Mexican adventure was humiliating; and if we had tried to ignore the plain lessons of the European war, we could not, seemingly, have been more indifferent. To-day our whole approach to the problem is revolutionized, and, if anything, we suffer from over-enthusiasm and the dangers of overconfidence. Congress has appropriated what a few months ago would seem the incredible sum of over six hundred million dollars for aeroplane service. The newspapers talk glibly of ending the war with 100,000 aeroplanes, which, from the tone of the articles, are to spring into existence on Monday, be transported to France on Tuesday, and "blind" the eyes of the German army by Saturday at the latest. A book like A Textbook of Naval Aeronautics supplies the sensible corrective to such false optimism. It is clear, truthful as to difficulties, expository in the best sense. But even with the brake of scientific analysis, the conviction cannot be totally restrained that in the development of the aeroplane is contained the future of military and naval tactics. If by native genius and industry, backed by an aroused public opinion, we can gain the difficult prize of "mastery of the air," the war is over. As Lord Beresford has said: "The new air warfare is going to be of so tremendous a character that it may supersede the Army and Navy." So far the current emphasis on the aeroplane's importance is justified.

Now, unfortunately, although American native genius is of the kind that can invent new improvements to the aeroplane and its motor and other mechanical appliances, our general industrial genius is for that type of manufacture which can turn out rapidly huge quantities of standardized products. The Ford automobile, of course, is the happiest illustration. Even our railroad locomotives, of which we are so proud, are in fact over-large and clumsy and somewhat heavy, compared with the compact, high-powered European locomotive which looks like a toy engine to us when we first go abroad. They, too, are "standardized." The building of an aeroplane, however, is essentially an individual job. Into it more than into any other type of construction has to go what we may call craftsmanship conscience. The making of an aeroplane requires mechanical tact, so to speak, patience and something akin to love. Every nut and bolt and screw and bit of taut wire has to be adjusted and "babied" with an eager enthusiasm which is hardly characteristic of the laborer creating impersonal machines. That craftsmanship conscience France possessed to a high degree; Germany compensates for it with her passion for scientific detail. We, too, must somehow acquire it, and the organization and individuals who brought this admirable and contemporaneous volume to publication

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will perform a genuine service in keeping alive the sense of its paramount importance.

Naturally A Textbook of Naval Aeronautics cannot concern itself with this kind of industrial exhortation. It is chiefly descriptive and historical. Some of the many photographs are like graphic illustrations of chapters in an early Wells scientific romance. There is all the information necessary for the prospective aeronaut—chapters on aerial photography, radio telegraphy, night flying, instruments for aerial navigation, courses of instruction and required qualifications of personnel for the air service of the United States Navy, training, navigation over water, submarine hunting by aircraft, locating submerged mines, etc., etc. No factual aspect of naval aeronautics is omitted. Our interest as lay strategists naturally centers for the most part on what aeroplanes can do to mitigate the submarine menace. As "spotters," of course, they are invaluable, for even when the submarine is painted the color of the water for disguise, the wake of the periscope is said to be visible from any high altitude. But it is not only as scouts that aeroplanes can be used to-day. Recently there have been authentic reports of submarines destroyed by bombs dropped from aeroplanes. The aircraft makes a next to impossible target for any gun mounted on the rolling deck of the submarine, whereas the aeroplane can swoop down almost any number of times in comparative safety. Admiral Fiske's suggestion of a torpedo-plane—an aircraft carrying on the bottom frame a detachable torpedo, which is released when the aircraft skims near the surface of the water—may revolutionize offensive attacks against first-class battleships. A successful air attack with this new weapon against the German High Sea Fleet would inevitably react by weakening submarine power, for the submarine's exit would then be impeded, according to Admiral Sir Reginald Constance, "by the small surface craft and submarines of the victor (American and English destroyers), which are then free to press in to gun range in the enemy's waters, with mines, nets and every new device."

H. S.

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